Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (Part 2a)
Tony Przygienda <tonysietf@gmail.com> Fri, 22 July 2022 19:26 UTC
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In-Reply-To: <92F73454-2598-4097-8CD9-C5E5A22CBEBE@juniper.net>
From: Tony Przygienda <tonysietf@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 15:25:51 -0400
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To: Jordan Head <jhead@juniper.net>
Cc: Alvaro Retana <aretana.ietf@gmail.com>, "rift-chairs@ietf.org" <rift-chairs@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-rift-rift@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-rift-rift@ietf.org>, "EXT-zhang.zheng@zte.com.cn" <zhang.zheng@zte.com.cn>, "rift@ietf.org" <rift@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (Part 2a)
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+1 thanks for review Alvaro and sorry for any omissions from previous reviews -- tony On Fri, Jul 22, 2022 at 8:55 AM Jordan Head <jhead@juniper.net> wrote: > Thanks, Alvaro, > > I have the necessary changes per your previous review implemented, no > submission as the draft upload tool isn't enabled yet. > > I'll start working through this round of comments with Tony. > > On 7/22/22, 8:00 AM, "Alvaro Retana" <aretana.ietf@gmail.com> wrote: > > [External Email. Be cautious of content] > > > Hi! > > I have a couple of replies and then some comments on the updated text > in -15. > > Thanks! > > Alvaro. > > > ... > > > Part 2a starts with §4.2 (Specification) and goes just through > §4.2.2 -- I > > > just started reading the LIE FSM/§4.2.2.1. I included a couple of > comments > > > on the schema itself. > ... > > > For the Chairs/Shepherd: > > > > - §8.1 includes a set of suggested UDP ports, but they are not > reflected > > > in the registry. Early allocation has not been requested -- you > should > > > consider doing so. See rfc7120. > > The same comment applies to the multicast addresses. > > > > ... > > > [minor] "IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 Hop Limit (HL) of 1" Was > GTSM > > > (rfc5082) considered? Several documents (for example, rfc8085 and > > > draft-ietf-opsec-v6) suggest its use. You may be asked about it > later. It > > > would be good to preempt those questions by adding some text in the > > > Security Considerations about any risks...or using it. > > > > There is a religious war about 255 vs. 1 since a long time. I > personally in > > deployment was hurt @ least twice by implementations ending up not > checking > > TTL/misprocessing and forwarding one-hop packets with 254 on unicast/ > > multicast. Also, having a buggy FIB looping tightly packets with TTL > 255 is > > seldom fun. I never saw a thing not decrementing TTL and dropping on > 1. I > > prefer the 1 with possibly a multi-hop spoof (never saw that in my > life > > frankly, such an attack is really, really hard to engineer) than a > rogue > > packet running away in the network or micro looping 255 times on > fast links. > > > > What I saw were replay attacks and against those RIFT is extremely > well > > protected as far it's practically implementable. Plus, if one > _really_ wants > > security one configures adjacency keys (and RIFT allows a full > plethora of > > that) rather than rely on the 255 hack to have "kind of a little > lick of > > security". > > > > So if the security folks push on it we can always go to 255 or write > that the > > TLL received MUST be either 255 or 1 to satisfy both camps. > ... > > > 1500 LIEs arriving with IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 Hop Limit > (HL) > > > 1501 larger than 1 MUST be ignored. > > > > > > [major] "MUST be ignored" The specification of the sender (§4.2.2) > says > > > that "LIEs SHOULD be sent with an IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 > Hop Limit > > > (HL) of 1". This is a Normative conflict because it is only > recommended to > > > the sender, but required by the receiver. > > > > aha, yes, very good. I'm reluctant to say MUST since it's not always > possible > > on a platform to force TTL (this is UDP). So I make it SHOULD on > both sides. > > > > your comment on the 255/1 stands of course. > > The text in -15 says: > > LIEs SHOULD be sent with an IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 Hop > Limit (HL) of either 1 or 255 to prevent RIFT information > reaching beyond a single L3 next-hop in the topology. > > ... > > LIEs arriving with IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 Hop Limit (HL) > different than 1 or 255 SHOULD be ignored. > > > The good thing is that you removed the Normative conflict: both > sentences now say SHOULD. The bad thing is that, even if providing > more options, anything can be used (1, 2, 4, 56, 123, 254, 255, etc.) > because neither the sender nor the receiver is required to do > anything. > > In the reply (above) you suggested using MUST. That would be a good > start. But then you also said you were reluctant... > > Note that in my original comment I was just asking whether GTSM was > considered and to justify why not (if you had considered and didn't > want to use it), not to add the cumbersome support for both cases. > IOW, do it any way you want, please be clear about any requirement > (MUST), and justify why you're not following what other documents > recommend (if not using 255) and how any issues can be mitigated (or > if they need to be -- see the Security Considerations in rfc5082). > > > > > > [major] "LIEs SHOULD be sent with network control precedence." > When is it > > > ok to not do so? IOW, when is this behavior recommended and not > required. > > > BTW, please add a reference. > > > > hard to implement often that's why it's not MUST. will add ref to > precedence. > > You didn't add a reference. > > > > ***** > What follows are comments on -15 covering the same sections (§4.2 > (Specification) through §4.2.2). > ***** > > [Line numbers from idnits.] > > > ... > 1417 4.2. Specification > ... > 1423 The FSMs, as usual, are presented as states the FSM can > assume, > 1424 events that it can be given and according actions performed > when > 1425 transitioning between states on event processing. > > 1427 Actions are performed before the end state is assumed. > > [nit] Suggestion> > The FSMs are presented as states a node (?) can be in, > events that can take place, and resulting actions, which > are performed before the next state is taken. > > > ... > 1441 Any attempt to transition from a state towards another on > reception > 1442 of an event where no action is specified MUST be considered > an > 1443 unrecoverable error, i.e. the protocol MUST reset all > adjacencies, > 1444 discard all the state and MAY NOT start again. > > [major] "MUST be considered an unrecoverable error" > > Given that the meaning of this phrase is explained, we don't need > Normative language: s/MUST/must > > > [major] "MAY NOT start again" > > "MAY NOT" is not an rfc2119 keyword. I assume you mean that the > behavior is not optional (i.e. mandatory), right? s/MAY NOT/MUST NOT > > > > ... > 1461 4.2.1. Transport > > 1463 All packet formats are defined in Thrift [thrift] models in > 1464 Appendix B. LIE packet format is contained in the > `LIEPacket` schema > 1465 element. TIE packet format is contained in `TIEPacket`, > TIDE and > 1466 TIRE accordingly in `TIDEPacket`, `TIREPacket` and the > whole packet > 1467 is a union of the above in `ProtocolPacket` while it > contains a > 1468 `PacketHeader` as well. > > [nit] s/ and the whole packet is a union of the above in > `ProtocolPacket` while it contains a `PacketHeader` as well./. The > whole packet is the union of a 'PacketHeader' and the above. > > > > ... > 1477 4.2.2. Link (Neighbor) Discovery (LIE Exchange) > ... > 1507 An implementation MAY listen and send LIEs on IPv4 and/or > IPv6 > 1508 multicast addresses. A node MUST NOT originate LIEs on an > address > 1509 family if it does not process received LIEs on that > family. LIEs on > 1510 same link are considered part of the same LIE FSM > independent of the > 1511 address family they arrive on. Observe further that the > LIE source > 1512 address may not identify the peer uniquely in unnumbered or > link- > 1513 local address cases so the response transmission MUST occur > over the > 1514 same interface the LIEs have been received on. A node MAY > use any of > 1515 the adjacency's source addresses it saw in LIEs on the > specific > 1516 interface during adjacency formation to send TIEs (Section > 4.2.3.3). > 1517 That implies that an implementation MUST be ready to accept > TIEs on > 1518 all addresses it used as source of LIE frames. > > [major] "An implementation MAY listen and send LIEs on IPv4 and/or > IPv6 multicast addresses." > > Sorry to come back to this, but it's really bothering me. After > reading this multiple times I figured out what is the problem: Yes, > it's optional to listen/send on IPv4 and/or IPv6 -- I too like the > flexibility. *But*, for rift to work there's an expectation that at > least one will be used. IOW, while the selection is flexible, > selecting (at least) one AF is *not* optional (otherwise the protocol > doesn't work). > > The "MAY" above is not a Normative statement because one AF (or both) > should be used. The sentence is really just a statement of fact: any > (or both) AF can be used. > > All this is to suggest this change: s/MAY/may > > > [major] "MAY use any of the adjacency's source addresses it saw in > LIEs...to send TIEs." This use of "MAY" makes using the source > address from a LIE optional. §4.2.3.3 says that "TIEs...using the > destination address on which the LIE adjacency has been formed", which > doesn't make the use optional. > > I'm also revisiting this -- again, statement of fact, not an option: > s/MAY/may > > > > 1520 A simplified version on platforms with limited multicast > support MAY > 1521 implement optional sending and reception of LIE frames on > IPv4 subnet > 1522 broadcast addresses and IPv6 all routers multicast address > though > 1523 such technique is less optimal and presents a wider attack > surface > 1524 from security perspective. > > [major] Ahhh...mmmm... > > Let's start with this: I'm not sure how to read this sentence, a few > commas would help. > > You don't need to solve all the cases. What is "limited multicast > support"? As I interpret the sentence, IPv6 seems to support > multicast so the choice is simple: use IPv6. As you explain, the node > doesn't have to use both. > > The phrase "MAY implement optional..." is a double indication that > "sending and reception" is optional: you don't have to. Which seems > to point to the obvious conclusion of use IPv6. > > In summary, I don't understand the value of this sentence, including > the use of a normative MAY ... but maybe I just don't understand the > sentence itself. :-( > > > > 1526 A ThreeWay adjacency (as defined in the glossary) over any > address > 1527 family implies support for IPv4 forwarding if the > 1528 `ipv4_forwarding_capable` flag in `LinkCapabilities` is set > to true. > 1529 A node, in case of absence of IPv4 addresses on such links > and > 1530 advertising `ipv4_forwarding_capable` as true, MUST forward > IPv4 > 1531 packets using gateways discovered on IPv6-only links > advertising this > 1532 capability. It is expected that the whole fabric supports > the same > 1533 type of forwarding of address families on all the links, > any other > 1534 combination is outside the scope of this specification. > 1535 `ipv4_forwarding_capable` MUST be set to true when LIEs > from a IPv4 > 1536 address are sent and MAY be set to true in LIEs on IPv6 > address if no > 1537 LIEs are sent from a IPv4 address. If IPv4 and IPv6 LIEs > indicate > 1538 contradicting information protocol behavior is unspecified. > > [major] "absence of IPv4 addresses...and advertising > `ipv4_forwarding_capable`...MUST forward IPv4 packets using gateways > discovered on IPv6-only links" > > Just to be clear, the choice of which AF to use when sending LIEs is > up to the nodes -- which then means that nodes may decide (or be > configured) to only use IPv6 with RIFT, even if IPv4 is configured on > the interface. Right? I assume that's true because it is the third > case shown in Table 1. > > IOW, not having IPv4 configured ("absence of IPv4 addresses") is not > the only case where ipv4_forwarding_capable can be set, and also not > the only case where the interface will support v4overv6. This will > also happen if the LIEs/TIEs are only advertised over IPv6 (regardless > of which AFs are supported/configured on the interface). > > The sentence above is then misleading because it mandates the v4overv6 > behavior only in the "absence of IPv4 addresses". > > > [major] "MUST forward IPv4 packets using gateways discovered on > IPv6-only links" > > I assume that this means that the IPv4 packet is encapsulated in IPv6 > and sent to a link-local address -- is that what you mean? Using > "gateways discovered" may give the impression that there's more > involved. You may want to consider being explicit about the > operation. > > Also, in Figure 1 the text (for the 3rd case: IPv4/IPv6 over IPv6) > simply says "IPv4 is forwarded", giving the wrong impression that the > IPv4 is natively (not encapsulated) forwarded. > > At some point we talked about the fact that forwarding is out of scope > -- that's ok. I'm calling out this text because it requires > forwarding ("MUST forward"). Please make the behavior non-normative > and declare the specific mechanism to "forward IPv4 packets...on > IPv6-only links" out of scope. > > > [minor] s/`ipv4_forwarding_capable` MUST be set to true when LIEs from > a IPv4 address are sent and MAY be set to true in LIEs on IPv6 address > if no LIEs are sent from a IPv4 address./If IPv4 forwarding is > supported on an interface, `ipv4_forwarding_capable` MUST be set to > true when LIEs from a IPv4 address are sent and MAY be set to true in > LIEs on IPv6 address if no LIEs are sent from a IPv4 address. > > > [nit] s/information protocol/information, protocol > > > > 1540 Operation of a fabric where only some of the links are > supporting > 1541 forwarding on an address family or have an address in a > family and > 1542 others do not is outside the scope of this specification. > > [] I think it's ok to leave the operation of the fabric out of scope, > but the ability to forward IPv4 traffic without having it configured > means that there are some operational aspects that are left out, and > which are not clearly specified anywhere else (as in not even in other > specifications). > > For example, take a look at §3/rfc9229 (IPv4 Routes with an IPv6 Next > Hop in the Babel Routing Protocol). The intent is not to compare, > just to point out a recent example of something similar which resulted > in significant discussion during IESG Evaluation. > > I don't expect any action, just something to keep in mind if it comes > up later. > > > > ... > 1550 > +=======+=======+=============================================+ > 1551 | AF | AF | Behavior > | > 1552 > +=======+=======+=============================================+ > 1553 | IPv4 | IPv4 | LIEs and TIEs are exchanged over IPv4, > no | > 1554 | | | IPv6 forwarding. TIEs are received on > any | > 1555 | | | of the LIE sending addresses. > | > 1556 > +-------+-------+---------------------------------------------+ > 1557 | IPv6 | IPv6 | LIEs and TIEs are exchanged over IPv6 > only, | > 1558 | | | no IPv4 forwarding if either of the > | > 1559 | | | `ipv4_forwarding_capable` flags is > false. | > 1560 | | | If both `ipv4_forwarding_capable` > flags are | > 1561 | | | true IPv4 is forwarded. TIEs are > received | > 1562 | | | on any of the LIE sending addresses. > | > 1563 > +-------+-------+---------------------------------------------+ > 1564 | IPv4, | IPv6 | LIEs and TIEs are exchanged over IPv6, > no | > 1565 | IPv6 | | IPv4 forwarding if either of the > | > 1566 | | | `ipv4_forwarding_capable` flags is > false. | > 1567 | | | If both `ipv4_forwarding_capable` are > true | > 1568 | | | IPv4 is forwarded. TIEs are received > on | > 1569 | | | any of the IPv6 LIE sending > addresses. | > 1570 > +-------+-------+---------------------------------------------+ > 1571 | IPv4, | IPv4, | LIEs and TIEs are exchanged over IPv6 > and | > 1572 | IPv6 | IPv6 | IPv4, unspecified behavior if either > of the | > 1573 | | | `ipv4_forwarding_capable` flags is > false or | > 1574 | | | IPv4 and IPv6 advertise different > flags as | > 1575 | | | described previously. IPv4 and IPv6 > are | > 1576 | | | forwarded. TIEs are received on any > of the | > 1577 | | | IPv4 and IPv6 LIE sending addresses. > | > 1578 > +-------+-------+---------------------------------------------+ > > [minor] Two of the columns have an "AF" header. It is not clear (just > from the header) how their meaning is different. Please clarify. > > I'm assuming that the first column shows the AFs enabled on the > interface, and the second one shows the AF used to exchange TIEs/LIEs. > Or does the first column represent which AFs are intended to be > forwarded (to cover the "absence of IPv4 addresses")? In either > case, it looks like the table may be incomplete. > > > [minor] The Behavior of the second and third cases is the same, which > adds to my question about what the AF columns mean. Are the columns > representing only one side? > > > [nit] Case 4: "IPv4 and IPv6 are forwarded." > > The placement of this sentence after the behavior of > ipv4_forwarding_capable is explained (again) gives the impression that > IPv4 and IPv6 are always forwarded. > > > [minor] Related question, so I don't forget later. In Case 2 > (IPv6/IPv6), for example, if only one side sets > ipv4_forwarding_capable, I'm assuming the TIEs won't include any IPv4 > information. Is that true? Where is that specified? It seems > obvious, but it would be nice if it was explicitly specified > somewhere. > > > > ... > 1608 A node MUST form a ThreeWay adjacency (or in other words > consider the > 1609 neighbor "valid" and hence reflecting it) if and only if the > 1610 following first order logic conditions are satisfied on a > LIE packet > 1611 as specified by the `LIEPacket` schema element and received > on a link > > [] -12 (the last version I had looked at) listed a couple of > conditions related to the PoDs: > > A node tries to form a three-way adjacency if and only if > > 1. the node is in the same PoD or either the node or the neighbor > advertises "undefined/any" PoD membership (PoD# = 0) AND > > ... > > 3. the neighbor is not member of some PoD while the node has a > northbound adjacency already joining another PoD AND > > > Are these conditions not needed any more? I know they were taken off > because I was confused with them -- but I guess that the text (in -12) > about how they could be "optionally disregarded" made them not > required. > > Just checking... > > > > ... > 1616 2. the neighboring node uses a valid System ID (i.e. value > different > 1617 from `IllegalSystemID`) in `sender` element in > `PacketHeader` > 1618 *and* > > [nit] s/in `sender` element/in the `sender` element > > > > 1620 3. the neighboring node uses a different System ID than > the node > 1621 itself > > [nit] For consistency, looks like you're missing an "*and*". > > > > 1623 4. the advertised MTUs in `LiePacket` element match on > both sides > 1624 *and* > > [major] This clause talks about the "advertised MTUs", but advertising > the MTU is optional. > > Suggestion> > the MTU on on the link (either advertised in the `LiePacket` > element or the 'default_mtu_size') matches on both sides *and* > > > [EoR P2a-15] > > > Juniper Business Use Only >
- [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (Part… Alvaro Retana
- [Rift] Fwd: Re: AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Tony Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Tony Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Pascal Thubert (pthubert)
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Pascal Thubert (pthubert)
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Tony Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Jordan Head
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Jordan Head
- [Rift] RIFT UDP Ports/Multicast Address Allocatio… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] RIFT UDP Ports/Multicast Address Alloc… Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Jordan Head