Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: SDES support is a MUST

Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com> Thu, 19 July 2012 17:41 UTC

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Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 13:42:47 -0400
From: Igor Faynberg <igor.faynberg@alcatel-lucent.com>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security Architecture: SDES support is a MUST
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If both parties have certificates, DTLS will provide end-to-end 
security.  (I have not yet heard a convincing argument why  the 
certificates--I mean not self-signed ones--cannot be used.)  And if the 
parties share a key, DTLS will work, too.

Igor

On 7/19/2012 12:29 PM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> On 7/19/12 6:25 PM, Igor Faynberg wrote:
>> On 7/19/2012 3:42 AM, Domenico Colella wrote:
>>> ...
>>> Why a company should buy ( ? expensive ?) DTLS-SRTP gateways (? and
>>> compatible with their legacy devices ?) or translators in order to
>>> support RTCWeb instead of a SRTMP server/gateway (i.e. open-source
>>> free products as Red5) and use FLASH ?..
>> Why is a "DTLS-SRTP gateway" needed--expensive or cheap?   DTLS-SRTP is
>> end-to-end.
> DTLS-SRTP does not provide end-to-end security in the WebRTC model, as
> already discussed in this mailing list.
>
> DTLS-SRTP does provide end-to-end encryption WITHOUT end-to-end security.
>
> Fabio
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