Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security

Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net> Sat, 28 July 2018 13:02 UTC

Return-Path: <rraszuk@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: rtgwg@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: rtgwg@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3915130DD2 for <rtgwg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 28 Jul 2018 06:02:17 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.399
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.399 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN=0.249, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.25, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4fdLY-gBYpSV for <rtgwg@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 28 Jul 2018 06:02:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pg1-x535.google.com (mail-pg1-x535.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::535]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A63A0124C04 for <rtgwg@ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Jul 2018 06:02:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-pg1-x535.google.com with SMTP id y4-v6so4758638pgp.9 for <rtgwg@ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Jul 2018 06:02:14 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id :subject:to:cc; bh=ytGZ5BvFhw7ekHk9o8hYperG7dLt0W248UFyT/dLPC8=; b=ieUJR2Ur+ar1LfKp70Kb99RhuZLNaLgLFHMYhFHFHyHDQ4Kf7ERD7EDfzc+HWm+xKw G2/Dq/bh99kUTUo6CqVOSCxQVliHvvejLH1zOadZDgxZL2bm9d7NY0ynNEv1lBcmrCxa wgHBRQeQiFcQyGBc3RPneUrhWO+mFiSNCmcK2aZnPMH0KoUIu+J2NCVP2EVkPwkj5NcJ gpKlWutHbSM5z/ucaXBRyEbR7zrEdJhGyBDEdG0HGWPzBYfYe3vuJfSfGB5fK8mjSGpm Zeika9joH04qGcbugGT/wXgj0QpNwReY8VggF3kxAOG//lpyFTEyNIIFqM9kpI5iCPKE cdAw==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from :date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ytGZ5BvFhw7ekHk9o8hYperG7dLt0W248UFyT/dLPC8=; b=tbnqdogAr4hWtO8K5zzXX8gkckl2exEKi9jgPckHKkVGbi739wcDWug9absKnkPxxE hSxEzQav+8vS8Jt8biUjRIOP7Z4IvBxfNTJFwy1ydITHl7rCNvmQ1PyD0oEdj1knyWaQ 7XNc4QzXVH9r9bSn40nJRvzZL0SqLKy87pK8fGclPWsVm9S4Siz9BTN3La2c1iJUuogG ebMDcOtFxbBybkY3qc7jCzZdvgBJWEYHenplDXULum6iVd/VJt6Y2vriHvmi+kYW2V/A 6LINDVniRBrUzL6xCwuVYS2UOqXj+V1e8hTNKUw5/gQxkLBxdigXCdRL9vLSuwQBq1QN jLlQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOUpUlG2mkV6/6+U3DEO6JyEiLWbVVn3XLwAJe1I8uY2CZ/GSGrDGXvY ln0xYsC22fv/1BT2B5Srrm/AvJuKz2b1xcOmKz3TdhfD
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpfQ4AN87dGRQRGss520sGJBvRLF4dJIxQpYB2WeR/pNo2rWIGkPgiSycPKTb82HMx83scKBBIhnYm2k3KbxUeE=
X-Received: by 2002:a65:4107:: with SMTP id w7-v6mr9348326pgp.302.1532782933903; Sat, 28 Jul 2018 06:02:13 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Sender: rraszuk@gmail.com
Received: by 2002:a17:90a:228e:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Sat, 28 Jul 2018 06:02:13 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <76CD132C3ADEF848BD84D028D243C927A71506F6@NKGEML515-MBS.china.huawei.com>
References: <CA+b+ERmfOaFMURD2eNPScs2SZ88rOEfGXZZJsqGDWX3M6bTY-g@mail.gmail.com> <0cb8f15b-7538-500c-dda3-915bf9814f94@gmail.com> <5D10C0C4-B93D-463F-A071-EEA6F35506CD@cisco.com> <CA+b+ERkqrr4Wr+Wy9q81SpyWi7H1s=z_RAvbc3Rbddvpgb7Xpg@mail.gmail.com> <76CD132C3ADEF848BD84D028D243C927A71506F6@NKGEML515-MBS.china.huawei.com>
From: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2018 15:02:13 +0200
X-Google-Sender-Auth: 4c6-v6-S7-smbhXDtklJ9_ijPxk
Message-ID: <CA+b+ERmWDhXf0ia8mQ25=QZw-h_ipkAQnttsirQb3kOk_fhUVA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
To: "Dongjie (Jimmy)" <jie.dong@huawei.com>
Cc: "Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com>, "rtgwg@ietf.org" <rtgwg@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000004b0c5005720ed677"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rtgwg/HClzIROMI10KxU3J9Gd3pKtLgIo>
X-BeenThere: rtgwg@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.27
Precedence: list
List-Id: Routing Area Working Group <rtgwg.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rtgwg>, <mailto:rtgwg-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rtgwg/>
List-Post: <mailto:rtgwg@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rtgwg-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg>, <mailto:rtgwg-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2018 13:02:18 -0000

Hi Jie,

> (network slicing) is to provide the demanding services with guaranteed
performance in a converged network,


Foundation of converged IP network is based on statistical multiplexing of
traffic demands. As such it is in its principle quite contradictory to
"guaranteed" characteristics (performance, delays, jitter, drops -- you
name it).

Application layers usually deal very well with all of the above I would
state - normal characteristics of IP networks..

No doubt there will be those trying to offer some network slicing with
guarantees and even those who will buy it. Just like today there are those
who offer you L2 circuit between endpoints except such L2 circuit is an
emulated one with zero OEM visibility to the IP infrastructure underneath.

Now the network slicing is clearly aiming for even more complexity under
the hood. And that is not the only problem. The issue is cost. When SP is
building the IP network the goal is to mux as many services on it as it
simply results in given's SP revenue. Network slicing is promising as
potentially just by configuration of few knobs they will be claiming
guarantees as RFC says - except RFC will not likely tell you to stop
over-provisioning.

Unless the idea is to use strict policing with dedicated queuing on active
and back paths or do something like RSVP IntServ also on active and backup
paths per customer - I really don't think you can really guarantee much.
And if you do that the cost would likely grow really steep.

So what is IMO the solution for assured/guaranteed global IP transit:

*A*  get diversely routed  dark fiber paths between your POPs (can be
unprotected) which btw today do not cost that much anymore
*B*  get diversely routed  optical channels alsol between your POPs (can be
unprotected)

*C*  use N disjoined by design (single AS Internet providers between your
end-points) + proper SD-WAN with active SLA monitoring

Clearly I am big supporter of *C* model for reasons discussed on this and
few other recent threads.

I assume network slicing will try to get into be something between A/B & C
but it is bounded up front with the cost of the two.

Many thx,
Robert.




On Sat, Jul 28, 2018 at 9:51 AM, Dongjie (Jimmy) <jie.dong@huawei.com>;
wrote:

> Hi Robert,
>
>
>
> IMO the two approaches are targeting at different use cases and customers.
>
>
>
> The former (network slicing) is to provide the demanding services with
> guaranteed performance in a converged network, while the latter (switching
> between multiple paralleled networks) provides the customer with the best
> performance that is available among those candidates. To me the latter is
> still some kind of best effort, and as Toerless said, it depends on the
> diversity you can have in the multiple networks.
>
>
>
> And I agree with Stewart on “you always pay a price for better than best
> effort.”
>
>
>
> Best regards,
>
> Jie
>
>
>
> *From:* rtgwg [mailto:rtgwg-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Robert Raszuk
> *Sent:* Wednesday, July 25, 2018 8:24 PM
> *To:* Acee Lindem (acee) <acee@cisco.com>;
> *Cc:* rtgwg@ietf.org
>
> *Subject:* Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
>
>
>
>
>
> True network slicing for IP networks means either waist of resources or
> very strict multi-level queuing at each hop and 100% ingress traffic
> policing. Yet while this has a chance to work during normal operation at
> the time of even regular failures this all pretty much melts like cheese on
> a good sandwich.
>
>
>
> It is going to be very interesting to compare how single complex sliced
> network compares for any end to end robust transport from N normal simple
> IP backbones and end to end SLA based millisecond switch over between one
> and another on a per flow basis. Also let's note then while the former is
> still to the best of my knowledge a draft the latter is already deployed
> globally in 100s of networks.
>
>
>
> Best,
> R.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Acee Lindem (acee) <acee@cisco.com>;
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> *From: *rtgwg <rtgwg-bounces@ietf.org>; on behalf of Stewart Bryant <
> stewart.bryant@gmail.com>;
> *Date: *Wednesday, July 25, 2018 at 5:55 AM
> *To: *Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>;
> *Cc: *Routing WG <rtgwg@ietf.org>;
> *Subject: *Re: VPN security vs SD-WAN security
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 25/07/2018 10:40, Robert Raszuk wrote:
>
> /* Adjusting the subject ... */
>
>
>
> ​Hello ​
>
> Stewart,
>
>
>
> ​You have made the below comment in the other thread we are having: ​
>
>
>
> Indeed, I would have expected this to be on a secure network of some sort
> either purely
> private or some form of VPN. However, I am sure I read in your text that
> you were
> considering using the Public Internet much in the way of SD-WAN.
>
>
>
> ​Would you mind as extensively as you can expand on the above statement ?
>
>
>
> Specifically on what basis do you treat say L2VPN or L3VPN of naked
> unencrypted packets often traveling on the very same links as this "bad"
> Internet traffic to be even slightly more secure then IPSEC or DTLS
> encrypted SD-WAN carried data with endpoints being terminated in private
> systems ?
>
>
>
> Thx,
>
> Robert
>
>
> Robert, I think that you have to take it as read that an air traffic
> control SoF system is encrypting its packets. If it is not, then it is
> clearly not fit for purpose.
>
> What concerns me is that an air traffic system is one of the most, if not
> the most, high profile targets in civil society. You get reminded of this
> each time you travel to IETF.
>
> The thing about safety of flight traffic is that a sustained and effective
> DDoS attack has global impact in a way that few other such attacks have.
>
> A VPN system ought to sustain resistance to such an attack better than the
> proposed system which treats the SoF traffic the same as regular traffic.
>
>
>
> I guess you are making a case for your network slicing work 😉
>
>
>
> Acee
>
>
>
> - Stewart
>
>
>