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[saag] RADIUS is deprecating MD5

Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> Sun, 24 March 2024 18:22 UTC

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From: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>
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Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2024 14:22:46 -0400
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Subject: [saag] RADIUS is deprecating MD5
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  To follow up on my comments at the mic in Brisbane, the RADEXT group is working on two documents:

* moving TLS to standards track:  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rieckers-radext-rfc6614bis/

* deprecating insecure practices:  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-radext-deprecating-radius/

  We expect to submit these documents for publication around IETF 120.

  We will be deprecating the use of RADIUS/UDP, in large part due to it's reliance on MD5.  Everyone shipping RADIUS clients should take a serious look at moving to TLS immediately.

  MD5 isn't getting any more secure, and there are few reasons left for staying with it.

  Alan DeKok.

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