Re: [saag] RADIUS is deprecating MD5

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Sun, 31 March 2024 15:36 UTC

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Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2024 11:37:17 -0400
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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References: <755BC73B-B981-4986-B45A-E9796DCC66BC@deployingradius.com> <ME0P300MB0713122730DC9574730AC816EE382@ME0P300MB0713.AUSP300.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <Zgl6ejdpJNOyUja0@chardros.imrryr.org> <E1B4CCB5-202F-4087-8B56-9E7F3D73D1D0@deployingradius.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] RADIUS is deprecating MD5
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On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 11:16:55AM -0400, Alan DeKok wrote:

> On Mar 31, 2024, at 11:00 AM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wrote:
> > I appreciate and agree that new protocols should not use MD5, but it is
> > not clear that there's a pressing case to deprecate its long-standing
> > use in RADIUS.  What attack is that guarding against?
> 
>   As Jan-Frederik pointed out, privacy is a huge one.
> 
>   In many cases, RADIUS packets are often sent across the net in the clear.  This exposes user identity, location, device information, etc.
> 
>   In many cases, Access-Request packets are unauthenticated, and lack all integrity checks.
> 
>   The only fix is to switch to TLS transport.

This does not sound like an MD5 issue, rather this is about metadata
leakage from RADIUS/UDP, and MD5 is mostly just collateral damage or
a distraction from the core issue?

-- 
    Viktor.