Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-protocol
"Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> Mon, 03 February 2014 03:09 UTC
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Date: Sun, 02 Feb 2014 19:08:51 -0800
From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu>
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Cc: draft-ietf-alto-protocol.all@tools.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-protocol
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On Sun, February 2, 2014 11:33 am, Jeffrey Hutzelman wrote: > On Sat, 2014-02-01 at 10:54 -0800, Dan Harkins wrote: > >> Also, given those >> restrictions and the fact that a tag just has to be less than >> or equal to 64 octets, the probability of identical tags being >> used is not zero. I think the probability of the tag from >> example 11.3.1.7 is 0.5 to collide with one of just 460 >> other Network Maps. >> >> I suggest requiring a tag to be 64 octets. That will make >> even money probability of collision among nearly 3000 >> other Network Maps, which is safer. > > OK, maybe I'm confused and reading out of context here. But I once had > someone tell me I needed to change my 5-character username because they > were requiring all usernames to be at least 6 characters, _in order to > increase the number of possible usernames_. That is, they claimed they > were increasing the size of a namespace by eliminating possible names. Well that's a hair brained policy, but username selection is not a good analogy. I was at a company that had no strict requirements on a username so there should have been a near infinite size of the namespace. But we had a collision when the company had less than 10 employees because there was another "dan" at the company. > The point is, if a tag is required to be exactly 64 octets, you get > 0x5e^64 possible tags. But if it is required to be up to 64 octets, you > get Sum(i=0..64) 0x5e^i possible tags, which is strictly greater than > 0x5e^64. So, requiring a tag to be 64 octets _reduces_ the number of > possible tags, thereby increasing the chance of collision. That would be the case if all tags in the Sum(i=1..64) 0x5e^i tagspace were equally probable of being chosen. Which implies implementations choosing a random tag length for each tag generated in addition to a random tag selection scheme for the randomly chosen length. I suspect, though, that in practice the tag length will be fixed for a particular implementation and the tag selection scheme will not necessarily be random. So the herd mentality, plus the proliferation of one or two companies' ALTO servers, will result in a severely reduced size of the effective tagspace and the increased possibility of collisions. A tag generated as SHA256(NetworkMap) represented in 64 hex characters would basically guarantee you'd never have a collision. Saying, "it can be anything you want as long as it's less than 64 octets" would not. Dan.
- [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-protocol Dan Harkins
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Dan Harkins
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Dan Harkins
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Richard Alimi
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Richard Alimi
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Dan Harkins
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Dan Harkins
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Richard Alimi
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Richard Alimi
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Y. Richard Yang
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Dan Harkins
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-alto-pro… Dan Harkins