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Re: [sidr] AD Review of sidr-origin-validation-signaling-09

"Alvaro Retana (aretana)" <aretana@cisco.com> Wed, 30 November 2016 16:57 UTC

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From: "Alvaro Retana (aretana)" <aretana@cisco.com>
To: "John G. Scudder" <jgs@juniper.net>, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Thread-Topic: [sidr] AD Review of sidr-origin-validation-signaling-09
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Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2016 16:57:16 +0000
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References: <88A45E79-880B-4F82-9FAA-80C05627A49F@cisco.com> <917E9000-8F1F-4E4F-BDEC-767E3510A71A@juniper.net> <yj9od1hdrah8.wl%morrowc@ops-netman.net> <F173D66B-3A4F-4C96-BFE2-02D83D8EB17B@juniper.net> <yj9oa8chr6to.wl%morrowc@ops-netman.net> <m260n5hywb.wl-randy@psg.com> <1E8CFD67-61BA-4CD3-8A96-CF38D283BD08@juniper.net> <m2twapgig4.wl-randy@psg.com> <22535C38-689F-4508-9A9C-2DD0A2E6BFC0@juniper.net>
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Cc: sidr wg list <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] AD Review of sidr-origin-validation-signaling-09
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Hi!

Yes, the text below works for me.  And I would assume it works for Tero as well.

Thanks!!

Alvaro.

On 11/30/16, 11:20 AM, "John G. Scudder" <jgs@juniper.net<mailto:jgs@juniper.net>> wrote:

On Nov 30, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com<mailto:randy@psg.com>> wrote:
section 4.5 of 4593 is relevant, or all of sec 4

Thanks, used in the text below.

i am kinda sad that 7132 is not too good on this

I looked there first but it's a *path* security threat model so can't really be blamed for not covering this.

Candidate new security section below. I'd appreciate an ack from Alvaro that this addresses his concern before I publish.

--John

6.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations such as those described in [RFC4272] continue
   to apply.  Since this document introduces an extended community that
   will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis in
   Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant.  These issues
   are neither new, nor unique to the origin validation extended
   community.

   The security considerations provided in [RFC6811] apply equally to
   this application of origin validation.  In addition, this document
   describes a scheme where router A outsources validation to some
   router B.  If this scheme is used, the participating routers should
   have the appropriate trust relationship -- B should trust A either
   because they are under the same administrative control or for some
   other reason (for example, consider
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light]).  The security properties of
   the propagation path between the two routers should also be
   considered.  See [RFC7454] Section 5.1 for advice regarding
   protection of the propagation path.

(all the refs above are in the "informative" section)

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