Re: [Sidrops] adopt draft-ymbk-sidrops-rpki-has-no-identity please

[George Michaelson <[e-mail]>]

You posed a MITM attack. You instantiated it as a bank account fraud.
I tried to decompose your koan to identify the parties, and I draw the
conclusion that the risk of fraud exists irrespective of the nature of
the signed object, can be trivially instantiated from abuse of things
signed, and demands the receiver and sender be naive respecting MITM
risk, and draw false conclusions from the provable INR part of the
signing.

It is likely a ROA only harms the creator if abused. There is a risk
an RTA or RSC signed statement harms the receiver or some third party.
If the transaction is like BYOip, and the receiver defines the form of
data to be signed and some suitable nonce or hash to be over-signed, I
think its starting to look safer.

I believe we all agree the RPKI does not prove identity. I would say
that use of RTA and RSC, is to bridge signed provable assertions about
INR, to some other space. What that space is, and how it is proved,
lies between the receiver and the sender (of that bridged, signed
assertion). If the assertion is badly drawn up, and the receiver draws
unjustified conclusions, especially from the proofs over the INR into
some other domain, They're SOL.

Ideally defining new signed object types would be easy. I don't think
it is, the initial proposing is fine, its closure to a registry in
process which takes forever. RTA and RSC also help bootstrap ideas
which probably emerge as specific ASN1 defined objects with structure
fit for purpose. There is an argument to be made that the hard test of
what should be in the ASN1 and what it means is the necessary cost to
avoiding risk like the MITM threat.

cheers

-G


On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 4:12 AM Randy Bush <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> >>    When a document is signed with the private key associated with a
> >>    RPKI certificate, the signer is speaking for the INRs, the IP
> >>    address space and Autonomous System (AS) numbers, in the
> >>    certificate.  This is not an identity; this is an authorization.
> >
> > Agreed.
>
> cool
>
> > Are you opposing the use of RPKI for signing LOAs, because I don't see
> > the document affecting the use of RPKI for RSC for signing LOAs.
>
> all depends on what is being Authorized by by the loA, doesn't it?
>
> i certainly seems reasonable to use an inr for 1.2.3.0/24 to sign loa
> for maria to originate that prefix.
>
> it does not seem reasonable to use an inr for 1.2.3.0/24 to sign loa for
> maria to withdraw funds from bill's bait and sushi's bank account.
>
> > The document says it doesn't prove identity. Correct. We all seem to
> > agree on that.
>
> that is not clear to me.  among other things, ggm's walls of text
> confuse me.  but i am easily confused.
>
> randy