Re: [Sip] draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-01

Henning Schulzrinne <hgs@cs.columbia.edu> Wed, 02 March 2005 21:24 UTC

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Message-ID: <42262E63.2030606@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Wed, 02 Mar 2005 16:21:39 -0500
From: Henning Schulzrinne <hgs@cs.columbia.edu>
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To: Cullen Jennings <fluffy@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [Sip] draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-01
References: <BE4B61FA.2BAB4%fluffy@cisco.com>
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They could, but are unlikely to be, simply because people won't remember 
to put all of the services they subscribed to into their whitelists, 
particularly ones that they are not going to hear from regularly. Even 
if the large majority of people were to whitelist the service, a modest 
fraction of forgetful users would significantly slow down the system as 
it would have to deal with thousands of destinations. (Similar 
considerations, with less of life-and-death flavor, apply to all kinds 
of notification systems, from airline flight notification to school 
closings.) Depending on where the hashcash is computed, one would have 
to do the whitelisting on every new device. We can't even synchronize 
cell phone address books reliably...

Before we recommend that we waste computing resources across the 
Internet, with dubious performance, it seems appropriate to investigate 
socially more responsible alternatives.

Cullen Jennings wrote:
> Presumable these services would be white listed and use Identity.
> 
> 
> On 3/2/05 10:59 AM, "Henning Schulzrinne" <hgs@cs.columbia.edu> wrote:
> 
> 
>>Also, applications like "reverse 911" (community emergency alert
>>systems) would be severely hampered by such approaches. With verifiable
>>source domains and domain-level trust mechanisms, I think we have better
>>tools at hand that don't require the 'make everyone suffer' approach.
>>
>>Michael Thomas wrote:
>>
>>>The big problem I have with hashcash is the advent of
>>>zombie armies. With them in mind, about them only
>>>thing you do is punish legitimate UA's with itsy-bitsy
>>>CPU's, and leave the spammers essentially unaffected
>>>with their near limitless CPU resources.

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