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Re: [lamps] [EXTERNAL] Re: LAMPS Re-charter

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Wed, 24 March 2021 16:53 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
cc: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth=40entrust.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>, LAMPS <spasm@ietf.org>
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Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 12:53:28 -0400
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [EXTERNAL] Re: LAMPS Re-charter
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Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
    > PQ-hybrid signatures are a much easier thing to tackle than PQ-hybrid
    > encryption.  But PQ-hybrid encryption is also the thing that has the
    > most urgency.  Signature verification has an out: verifiers can
    > time-bound their acceptance of legacy signatures once a quantum-based
    > cryptanalytic attack becomes known to be plausible.

Do you mean that a verifier can say, "I'll accept your legacy signature as
long as it's less than 2hr old"
("2hr" being the time I think it takes for a PQ to be mounted).

Or are you saying something different?

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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