Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression)

Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net> Wed, 03 April 2024 21:16 UTC

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From: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2024 23:15:24 +0200
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To: Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Cc: Alvaro Retana <aretana.ietf@gmail.com>, SPRING WG List <spring@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression)
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Hi Joel,

My interpretation of text from RFC8200 is that it allows discrepancy
between the header and the upper layer checksum as long as final packet's
destination sees the correct one.

The last condition is met.

So I see no issue.

Sure RFC8200 does not talk about SRH nor cSIDs, but provides a hint on how
to handle such future situations.

With that being said I would like to still understand what real problem are
we hitting here ...

Kind regards,
Robert

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 11:09 PM Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com> wrote:

> There are two cases covered in section 6.5 of the compression draft that
> appear to be at variance with secton 8.1 of RFC 8200.
>
> First, if the final destination in the routing header is a compressed
> container, then the ultimate destination address will not be the same as
> the final destination shown in the routing header.
>
> Second, if a uSID container is used as the destination address and no SRH
> is present, then in addition to the above problem there is no routing
> header to trigger the behavior described.
>
> Yours,
>
> Joel
> On 4/3/2024 4:22 PM, Robert Raszuk wrote:
>
> Hi Alvaro,
>
> Section 6.5 of draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression describes the
>> behavior when an originating node inside an SRv6 domain creates a
>> packet with a C-SID as the final destination.
>> *This description differs from the text in Section 8.1 of RFC8200.*
>
>
> I would like you to clarify the above statement - specifically of the last
> sentence.
>
> Reason for this that after looking at both drafts I find section 6.5 of
> the subject draft to be exactly in line with RFC8200 section 8.1 especially
> with the paragraf which says:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *         If the IPv6 packet contains a Routing header, the Destination
>        Address used in the pseudo-header is that of the final
>  destination.  At the originating node, that address will be in
>  the last element of the Routing header; at the recipient(s),          that
> address will be in the Destination Address field of the          IPv6
> header. *
>
> So before we dive into solutions (as Andrew has already provided a few of)
> I think we should first agree on what precise problem are we solving here ?
>
> Many thx,
> Robert
>
> PS. As a side note I spoke with my hardware folks - just to check if
> validation of upper-layer checksum is even an option for transit nodes. The
> answer is NO as most data plane hardware can read at most 256 bytes of
> packets. So unless there is some specialized hardware processing up to 9K
> packets in hardware at line rates this entire discussion about checksum
> violations, fears of firing appeals is just smoke.
>
>