Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression)
Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com> Fri, 05 April 2024 14:26 UTC
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Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2024 10:26:43 -0400
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To: Francois Clad <fclad.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression)
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<No Hats.> I think I understand your description. At base, I think you are arguing that a compresssed container should be understood to be a representation of a segment list. As a corollary of that, you are saying that the text in 9.1 means that a host in an SRv6 domain must not have explicitly configured uSID containers as destination addresses (either in config files, in manually entered destinations, or from DNS resolution>) And that 9.1 is sufficiently clear that users or admins will not be surprised by failures? Yours, Joel On 4/5/2024 4:02 AM, Francois Clad wrote: > Hi Joel, > > The current text of section 9.1 says: > > "When pinging a SID of this document without a segment list, the SR > source node places the SID in the destination address of the ICMPv6 > echo request and MUST set the Argument of the SID to 0. [...]" > > "When pinging a SID of this document via a segment list, the SR source > node MUST construct the IPv6 packet as described in Section 6 and > compute the ICMPv6 checksum as described in Section 6.5.” > > It seems to me that the two cases are explicitly spelled out. > > If I understand correctly, the system that you are referring to is > steering traffic onto a segment list. Diagnostic packets should thus > be handled in the same way (2nd case above). From a user perspective, > the diagnostic tools (e.g., ping) are used with a compressed SRv6 > SID-list in the same that they are used with any other SRv6 SID-list. > > Cheers, > Francois > > On 4 Apr 2024 at 23:17:53, Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com> wrote: >> <No Hats> >> >> A uSID container is a list of destination. It can e specified as a DA >> without an SRH. If I had a sysstme which was using that, and I was >> having trouble, trying a ping with the uSID container as the DA would >> seem to be an obvious diagnostic. If we want to tell folks they cabn't >> do that, it seems like we need to say so. The existing text Francois >> points to seems too vague to expect folks to understand the limitation >> (assuming there is such a limitation.) >> >> Yours, >> >> Joel >> >> On 4/4/2024 2:47 PM, Martin Vigoureux (Nokia) wrote: >>> Joel, >>> >>> do you mean specifying the sid *list* as the DA? >>> >>> -m >>> >>> Le 2024-04-04 à 19:26, jmh.direct a écrit : >>> > >>> > CAUTION:This is an external email. Please be very careful when >>> > clicking links or opening attachments. See the URL nok.it/ext >>> <http://nok.it/ext> for >>> > additional information. >>> > >>> > So you can't ping a uSID list by just specifying the uSID as the DA? >>> > Yours, >>> > Joel >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > Sent via the Samsung Galaxy S20 FE 5G, an AT&T 5G smartphone >>> > >>> > >>> > -------- Original message -------- >>> > From: Francois Clad <fclad.ietf@gmail.com> >>> > Date: 4/4/24 1:10 PM (GMT-05:00) >>> > To: Joel Halpern <jmh.direct@joelhalpern.com> >>> > Cc: SPRING WG List <spring@ietf.org>, Robert Raszuk >>> > <robert@raszuk.net>, Andrew Alston - IETF <andrew-ietf@liquid.tech> >>> > Subject: Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums >>> > (draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression) >>> > >>> > Hi Joel, >>> > >>> > One can ping a SID of this document without a segment list by simply >>> > running the ping command with that SID as an argument (2nd paragraph >>> > of section 9.1). >>> > >>> > To ping a SID of this document via a SID list, one needs to configure >>> > the originator node to impose that SID list, like any other SRv6 SID >>> > list. >>> > >>> > Hope this helps. >>> > >>> > Cheers, >>> > Francois >>> > >>> > >>> > On 4 Apr 2024 at 16:29:11, Joel Halpern <jmh.direct@joelhalpern.com >>> > <mailto:jmh.direct@joelhalpern.com>> wrote: >>> >> >>> >> <No Hats> >>> >> >>> >> It seems that the text you quote requires that the ping code or >>> >> kernel code know that the user has specified a uSID for the ping >>> >> DA. Maybe I am missing something, but it is not obvious to me how >>> >> that would be achieved? And does seem to imply that an unmodified >>> >> ping will get incompatible and unexpected results? >>> >> >>> >> Yours, >>> >> >>> >> Joel >>> >> >>> >> On 4/4/2024 10:23 AM, Francois Clad wrote: >>> >>> Hi Joel, >>> >>> >>> >>> The ping behavior is described in section 9.1 of the draft >>> >>> >>> (https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression-14.html#section-9.1). >>> >>> >>> >>> Specifically, >>> >>> "When pinging a SID of this document via a segment list, the SR >>> >>> source node MUST construct the IPv6 packet as described in Section >>> >>> 6 and compute the ICMPv6 checksum as described in Section 6.5." >>> >>> >>> >>> Please let me know if anything in this text is not clear. >>> >>> >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Francois >>> >>> >>> >>> On 4 Apr 2024 at 16:10:11, Joel Halpern >>> >>> <jmh.direct@joelhalpern.com> wrote: >>> >>>> >>> >>>> <No Hat> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Does this mean that if I have a source and destiantion host inside >>> >>>> an SRv6 domain, and I am trying to verify a uSID path between >>> >>>> them, so I issue the command ping <usUD-DA>, it will fail? Given >>> >>>> that we have documents describing the use of ping and traceroute >>> >>>> with SRv6, shouldn't the comrpession document say someething about >>> >>>> this? >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Your,s >>> >>>> >>> >>>> Joel >>> >>>> >>> >>>> On 4/4/2024 9:59 AM, Francois Clad wrote: >>> >>>>> Hi Andrew, >>> >>>>> >>> >>>>> The originator (TX Linux box in your case) acting as an SR source >>> >>>>> node for C-SID must follow the entire Section 6 of >>> >>>>> draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression, including section 6.5 >>> >>>>> about the checksum calculation. One cannot expect it to work if >>> >>>>> it only implements half of it. >>> >>>>> >>> >>>>> On the receive side, there is nothing special to do. The DA in >>> >>>>> the received IPv6 header is the one that was used for the >>> >>>>> checksum calculation. >>> >>>>> >>> >>>>> I do not see anything broken. >>> >>>>> >>> >>>>> Cheers, >>> >>>>> Francois >>> >>>>> >>> >>>>> On 4 Apr 2024 at 15:32:12, Andrew Alston - IETF >>> >>>>> <andrew-ietf@liquid.tech> wrote: >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> So in investgiating this further, there is a further problem. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> I’ve checked on 4 different linux boxes with 4 different network >>> >>>>>> cards. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Linux by default offloads TX checksumming on a lot of network >>> >>>>>> cards. If you originate a packet with a microsid and no SRH – >>> >>>>>> and the linux box offloads the checksum generation – the >>> >>>>>> checksum generated by the NIC will be incorrect – and when the >>> >>>>>> packet arrives at the end host – if that end host is running RX >>> >>>>>> checksumming – the checksum will fail and the packet will be >>> >>>>>> dropped. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> If you disable TX checksumming – the kernel will have no way to >>> >>>>>> tell if the packet is an Ipv6 or a microsid packet, it will >>> >>>>>> therefore use the DA – and generate an incorrect checksum. >>> >>>>>> Again – if RX checksumming is enabled on the receiving end point >>> >>>>>> – the packet will get dropped. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Effectively this does NOT just affect middle boxes – it effects >>> >>>>>> anything generating a packet directed to a microsid that either >>> >>>>>> offloads the tx to hardware (whichi will have no clue this is a >>> >>>>>> microsid) or in the alternative is generating tx checksums >>> >>>>>> itself via kernel mechanisms that will treat these packets as >>> >>>>>> standard Ipv6 packets. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> This is broken – severely broken. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Andrew >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> * >>> >>>>>> * >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> * >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Internal All Employees >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> From: *spring <spring-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Francois >>> >>>>>> Clad <fclad.ietf@gmail.com> >>> >>>>>> *Date: *Thursday, 4 April 2024 at 14:49 >>> >>>>>> *To: *Joel Halpern <jmh.direct@joelhalpern.com> >>> >>>>>> *Cc: *SPRING WG List <spring@ietf.org>, Robert Raszuk >>> >>>>>> <robert@raszuk.net> >>> >>>>>> *Subject: *Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums >>> >>>>>> (draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression) >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Some people who received this message don't often get email from >>> >>>>>> fclad.ietf@gmail.com. Learn why this is important >>> >>>>>> <https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification> >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> CAUTION: This email has originated from a free email service >>> >>>>>> commonly used for personal email services, please be guided >>> >>>>>> accordingly especially if this email is asking to click links or >>> >>>>>> share information. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Hi all, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Section 6.5 of draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression specifies >>> >>>>>> how an SR source node originating a packet with an upper layer >>> >>>>>> checksum determines the Destination Address for use in the IPv6 >>> >>>>>> pseudo-header. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> As a co-author, I’d say that the current text of 6.5 is good. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> This text is aligned with RFC 8200. It only indicates how the >>> >>>>>> text in Section 8.1 of RFC 8200 applies to the SIDs of >>> >>>>>> draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression. This is necessary since >>> >>>>>> RFC 8200 does not specify the format nor behavior of any source >>> >>>>>> routing scheme. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Thanks, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Francois >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> On 4 Apr 2024 at 00:10:55, Joel Halpern >>> >>>>>> <jmh.direct@joelhalpern.com> wrote: >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> I can not speak to the "norm" for other working groups. The >>> >>>>>> SPRING charter is very specific about what we have to do if we >>> >>>>>> want to change an underlying protocol. We have to go back to >>> >>>>>> the WG which owns that protocol. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> 6man gets to decide if the change is acceptable, and if it is >>> >>>>>> acceptable how it is to be represented. SPRINGs job is to >>> >>>>>> make sure we are asking the question we intend. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Yours, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Joel >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> On 4/3/2024 6:05 PM, Robert Raszuk wrote: >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Ok Joel, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Thank you for this clarification. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> To me the actual spirit of RFC8200 8.1 is to say that it >>> >>>>>> is ok to compute the checksum by the src such that it >>> >>>>>> comes out right at the final destination. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> But I guess we can have different opinions about that. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> But what I find specifically surprising here is that it is >>> >>>>>> a norm in IETF to have new specifications >>> >>>>>> defining protocol extensions and their behaviour and never >>> >>>>>> go back to the original protocol RFC to check if this is >>> >>>>>> ok or not. If that would not be a normal process I bet we >>> >>>>>> would still be using classful IPv4 routing all over the >>> >>>>>> place. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Regards, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Robert >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 11:28 PM Joel Halpern >>> >>>>>> <jmh@joelhalpern.com> wrote: >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> The concern with regard to the text that the chairs >>> >>>>>> are asking about is not about intermediate nodes >>> >>>>>> verifying the checksum. The text does not talk >>> aabout >>> >>>>>> that, so we are not asking about that. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> But, the text in 8200 specifies how the originating >>> >>>>>> node is to compute the upper layer checksum. It >>> >>>>>> doesn't say "do whatever you need to do to make the >>> >>>>>> destination come out right". It provides specific >>> >>>>>> instructions. Yes, it is understandable that those >>> >>>>>> instructions do not cover the compressed container >>> >>>>>> cases. Which is why the compression document >>> >>>>>> specifies changes to those procedures. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Thus, we need to ask 6man how they want to handle the >>> >>>>>> change in the instructions in 8200. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> the question we are asking SPRING is whether there is >>> >>>>>> any clarification people want to the text in the >>> >>>>>> compression draft before we send the question over to >>> >>>>>> 6man. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Yours, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Joel >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> On 4/3/2024 5:15 PM, Robert Raszuk wrote: >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Hi Joel, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> My interpretation of text from RFC8200 is that it >>> >>>>>> allows discrepancy between the header and the >>> >>>>>> upper layer checksum as long as final packet's >>> >>>>>> destination sees the correct one. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> The last condition is met. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> So I see no issue. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Sure RFC8200 does not talk about SRH nor cSIDs, >>> >>>>>> but provides a hint on how to handle such future >>> >>>>>> situations. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> With that being said I would like to still >>> >>>>>> understand what real problem are we hitting here >>> >>>>>> ... >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Robert >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 11:09 PM Joel Halpern >>> >>>>>> <jmh@joelhalpern.com> wrote: >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> There are two cases covered in section 6.5 of >>> >>>>>> the compression draft that appear to be at >>> >>>>>> variance with secton 8.1 of RFC 8200. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> First, if the final destination in the >>> routing >>> >>>>>> header is a compressed container, then the >>> >>>>>> ultimate destination address will not be the >>> >>>>>> same as the final destination shown in the >>> >>>>>> routing header. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Second, if a uSID container is used as the >>> >>>>>> destination address and no SRH is present, >>> >>>>>> then in addition to the above problem >>> there is >>> >>>>>> no routing header to trigger the behavior >>> >>>>>> described. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Yours, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Joel >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> On 4/3/2024 4:22 PM, Robert Raszuk wrote: >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Hi Alvaro, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Section 6.5 of >>> >>>>>> draft-ietf-spring-srv6-srh-compression >>> >>>>>> describes the >>> >>>>>> behavior when an originating node >>> >>>>>> inside an SRv6 domain creates a >>> >>>>>> packet with a C-SID as the final >>> >>>>>> destination. _This description >>> differs >>> >>>>>> from the text in Section 8.1 of >>> >>>>>> RFC8200._ >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> I would like you to clarify the above >>> >>>>>> statement - specifically of the last >>> >>>>>> sentence. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Reason for this that after looking at >>> both >>> >>>>>> drafts I find section 6.5 of the subject >>> >>>>>> draft to be exactly in line with RFC8200 >>> >>>>>> section 8.1 especially with the paragraf >>> >>>>>> which says: >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> * If the IPv6 packet contains a >>> >>>>>> Routing header, the Destination >>> >>>>>> Address used in the >>> pseudo-header >>> >>>>>> is that of the final >>> >>>>>> destination. At the originating >>> >>>>>> node, that address will be in >>> >>>>>> the last element of the Routing >>> >>>>>> header; at the recipient(s), >>> >>>>>> that address will be in the >>> >>>>>> Destination Address field of the >>> >>>>>> IPv6 header.* >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> So before we dive into solutions (as >>> >>>>>> Andrew has already provided a few of) I >>> >>>>>> think we should first agree on what >>> >>>>>> precise problem are we solving here ? >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Many thx, >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> Robert >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> PS. As a side note I spoke with my >>> >>>>>> hardware folks - just to check if >>> >>>>>> validation of upper-layer checksum is >>> even >>> >>>>>> an option for transit nodes. The >>> answer is >>> >>>>>> NO as most data plane hardware can >>> read at >>> >>>>>> most 256 bytes of packets. So unless >>> there >>> >>>>>> is some specialized hardware >>> processing up >>> >>>>>> to 9K packets in hardware at line rates >>> >>>>>> this entire discussion about checksum >>> >>>>>> violations, fears of firing appeals is >>> >>>>>> just smoke. >>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>> >>>>>> spring mailing list >>> >>>>>> spring@ietf.org >>> >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spring >>> >>>>>> >>> > >>> > _______________________________________________ >>> > spring mailing list >>> > spring@ietf.org >>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spring >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> spring mailing list >>> spring@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spring >> >> _______________________________________________ >> spring mailing list >> spring@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spring
- [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (draft-… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Andrew Alston - IETF
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Andrew Alston - IETF
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Francois Clad
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Andrew Alston - IETF
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Andrew Alston - IETF
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Francois Clad
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Andrew Alston - IETF
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Francois Clad
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Andrew Alston - IETF
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Andrew Alston - IETF
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Francois Clad
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… jmh.direct
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Andrew Alston - IETF
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Cheng Li
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Martin Vigoureux (Nokia)
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Cheng Li
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Antoine FRESSANCOURT
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Martin Vigoureux (Nokia)
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Tal Mizrahi
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Francois Clad
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Francois Clad
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Francois Clad
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Ketan Talaulikar
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Boris Hassanov
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Ketan Talaulikar
- Re: [spring] [**EXTERNAL**] Re: C-SIDs and upper … Shah, Himanshu
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Joel Halpern
- Re: [spring] [**EXTERNAL**] Re: C-SIDs and upper … Robert Raszuk
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Francois Clad
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… liu.yao71
- Re: [spring] [**EXTERNAL**] Re: C-SIDs and upper … Mark Smith
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… linchangwang
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… liu.yao71
- Re: [spring] C-SIDs and upper layer checksums (dr… 梁艳荣