Re: [stir] Review of: draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-10

"Peterson, Jon" <jon.peterson@neustar.biz> Thu, 18 August 2016 17:54 UTC

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From: "Peterson, Jon" <jon.peterson@neustar.biz>
To: "dcrocker@bbiw.net" <dcrocker@bbiw.net>, "Gorman, Pierce A [CTO]" <Pierce.Gorman@sprint.com>
Thread-Topic: [stir] Review of: draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-10
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Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2016 17:51:24 +0000
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References: <c3a85ffc-8340-ac54-4d8e-21a16fefd032@dcrocker.net> <D3D41210.1A72E4%jon.peterson@neustar.biz> <CAHBDyN7W8zkgGjeUqzGaxLfRD-nFDgD9R3kxioQ47Kbp4_B8EA@mail.gmail.com> <6bd1e4bc946a4a02a1f4fdac385984b9@PLSWE13M08.ad.sprint.com> <D3DB2EE9.1A7B59%jon.peterson@neustar.biz> <fbf38cef-bfb0-60df-175d-c57362917c4c@dcrocker.net>
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Cc: "stir@ietf.org" <stir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [stir] Review of: draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-10
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The most common uses we envision look like 2 or 3: either cases where some
specialized authority signs for an identity, one who is not necessarily an
authority for the telephone number in question but will be trusted by
relying parties for some other reason; or cases where you are adding some
new field to the scope of protection, like say the display-name or some
non-SIP field. But yes, 1 could also be the case for some of the
interworking with WebRTC IdPs we've considered. For the purposes of this
spec, though, we just want some very high-level motivation.

Jon Peterson
Neustar, Inc.

On 8/18/16, 10:05 AM, "stir on behalf of Dave Crocker"
<stir-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of dhc@dcrocker.net> wrote:

>On 8/18/2016 9:48 AM, Peterson, Jon wrote:
>> Oh, we've allowed for multiple Identity headers for some time - the
>> problem is we don't really give any reason why we allow them or any
>> sense of what it might mean to have more than one. We need to say at
>> least something about that, though largely this is a matter of forward
>> compatibility with some future use cases that we know are under
>> consideration that we don't want to rule out.
>
>
>1. In the abstract, there could be different identifiers that are
>authenticated.  That's probably not supposed to be allowed for a SIP
>environment, but since there apparently can be different identifiers
>used as input to validation, perhaps it is allowed.
>
>2. There can be different authorities used to create the authentication.
>This permits trust assessment of a combination of entities making
>validity assertions.
>
>3. There can be different technical details to the signature.  Different
>canonicalizations, different crypto algorithms, different keys.  All of
>these might affect survival through transit and/or ability of the
>recipient to process.
>
>d/
>-- 
>
>   Dave Crocker
>   Brandenburg InternetWorking
>   bbiw.net
>
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