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Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00

Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> Mon, 31 May 2021 16:53 UTC

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Reply-To: dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com
From: Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com>
To: 'Russ Housley' <housley@vigilsec.com>, 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: 'Hannes Tschofenig' <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>, suit@ietf.org
References: <19586.1622075797@localhost> <DBBPR08MB5915CEC125579D78C108D540FA3F9@DBBPR08MB5915.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com> <F6C86CC2-3AF8-4CC5-BB47-AC6579DAA0C4@vigilsec.com> <13894.1622479289@localhost> <64BDF7A0-4B70-4EB3-A764-2BD6CAA3921A@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Mon, 31 May 2021 12:53:06 -0400
Organization: Reliable Energy Analytics LLC
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Subject: Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00
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" If a trustworthy party in the middle of the distribution path is able to
detect a problem with cleartext (but signed) firmware, they can report a
vulnerability and refuse to pass the update along."

This is precisely the function SCRM vendors are performing today. Encrypting
a binary object would be an impediment to software supply chain risk
assessment functions in place today.

Thanks,

Dick Brooks

Never trust software, always verify and report! T
http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com
Email: dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com
Tel: +1 978-696-1788

-----Original Message-----
From: Suit <suit-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Russ Housley
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2021 12:49 PM
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>; suit@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00

Michael:

>>> I agree that there are also challenges with certification schemes 
>>> that prevent developers from seeing the source code (or from 
>>> publishing the source code). That's yet another issue.
> 
>> SUIT is using signature for the authentication and integrity of the 
>> firmware.  If the signature remains in place, a party in the middle 
>> of the distribution cannot insert any malware.
> 
> The encryption of the firmware keeps third parties from auditing the 
> software updates to determine if malware has been inserted at the
"factory"
> Both white and black hats are currently using binary diff systems to 
> look at patches.  Black hats use this to develop exploits in the gap 
> between 9am EST and 9am PST!
> I am suggesting that this is a "Security Consideration"

Yes, this is a reasonable thing to add to the Security Considerations.

If a trustworthy party in the middle of the distribution path is able to
detect a problem with cleartext (but signed) firmware, they can report a
vulnerability and refuse to pass the update along.

Russ
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