Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00
Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Mon, 31 May 2021 16:56 UTC
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Mon, 31 May 2021 12:56:04 -0400
Cc: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>, suit@ietf.org
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To: Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com>
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Subject: Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00
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Dick: Yes, and there are other use cases that require encryption. Russ > On May 31, 2021, at 12:53 PM, Dick Brooks <dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com> wrote: > > " If a trustworthy party in the middle of the distribution path is able to > detect a problem with cleartext (but signed) firmware, they can report a > vulnerability and refuse to pass the update along." > > This is precisely the function SCRM vendors are performing today. Encrypting > a binary object would be an impediment to software supply chain risk > assessment functions in place today. > > Thanks, > > Dick Brooks > > Never trust software, always verify and report! T > http://www.reliableenergyanalytics.com > Email: dick@reliableenergyanalytics.com > Tel: +1 978-696-1788 > > -----Original Message----- > From: Suit <suit-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Russ Housley > Sent: Monday, May 31, 2021 12:49 PM > To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> > Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>; suit@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 > > Michael: > >>>> I agree that there are also challenges with certification schemes >>>> that prevent developers from seeing the source code (or from >>>> publishing the source code). That's yet another issue. >> >>> SUIT is using signature for the authentication and integrity of the >>> firmware. If the signature remains in place, a party in the middle >>> of the distribution cannot insert any malware. >> >> The encryption of the firmware keeps third parties from auditing the >> software updates to determine if malware has been inserted at the > "factory" >> Both white and black hats are currently using binary diff systems to >> look at patches. Black hats use this to develop exploits in the gap >> between 9am EST and 9am PST! >> I am suggesting that this is a "Security Consideration" > > Yes, this is a reasonable thing to add to the Security Considerations. > > If a trustworthy party in the middle of the distribution path is able to > detect a problem with cleartext (but signed) firmware, they can report a > vulnerability and refuse to pass the update along. > > Russ > _______________________________________________ > Suit mailing list > Suit@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/suit >
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Russ Housley
- [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Michael Richardson
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Carsten Bormann
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Russ Housley
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Laurence Lundblade
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Russ Housley
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Michael Richardson
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Russ Housley
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Russ Housley
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Brendan Moran
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks
- Re: [Suit] suit-firmware-encryption-00 Dick Brooks