Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 18 May 2017 21:37 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 18 May 2017 17:30:54 -0400
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To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
Cc: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard
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I don't much care, but we've moved to "forward secrecy" in TLS 1.3. -Ekr On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 5:17 PM, Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com > wrote: > Hi, > > Thanks Tim and Uri for the comment. At least wikipedia considers them as > equivalent. I am fine either way, but leave it as pfs unless there is a > consensus to change it to forward secrecy. If having fs seems important to > you please let us know asap! > > Yours, > Daniel > > On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL < > uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote: > >> It is a mathematical cryptographic term, and as such is incontrovertible. >> >> I say leave it in. >> >> Regards, >> Uri >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >> > On May 18, 2017, at 16:58, Timothy Jackson <tjackson@mobileiron.com> >> wrote: >> > >> > One small nit. >> > >> >> ECDHE provides perfect forward secrecy >> > I thought we had decided to change “perfect forward secrecy” to just >> “forward secrecy” since “perfect” is such a difficult standard to reach? >> > >> > Tim >> > — >> > Tim Jackson | Product Security Architect | MobileIron, Inc. >> > >> > On 5/18/17, 10:45 AM, "TLS on behalf of Daniel Migault" < >> tls-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of daniel.migault@ericsson.com> wrote: >> > >> > Hi Simon, >> > >> > Thank you for the review. I believe we have addressed your comments >> in our version 04. Please see my comments inline. >> > >> > Yours, >> > Daniel >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Simon >> Friedberger >> > Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 5:59 PM >> > To: ietf@ietf.org >> > Cc: tls@ietf.org >> > Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> >> (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer >> Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard >> > >> > Nits: >> > >> > RFC 4279 reference is missing. >> > MGLT: It seems the reference is mentioned in the current version in >> the Normative reference as well as in the introduction at line 127, in >> section 3 line 143. In case you meant another reference, please let us know. >> > >> > >> > >> > "TLS 1.3 and above version, " should probably be "TLS 1.3 and >> above" or "TLS 1.3 and higher versions" >> > MGLT: Changed to "TLS 1.3 and higher versions" >> > >> >> On 04/05/17 18:41, The IESG wrote: >> >> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG >> >> (tls) to consider the following document: >> >> - 'ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer >> >> Security (TLS)' >> >> <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> as Proposed Standard >> >> >> >> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits >> >> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the >> >> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2017-05-18. Exceptionally, comments may >> >> be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the >> >> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. >> >> >> >> Abstract >> >> >> >> >> >> This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport >> >> Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The cipher suites are all based on >> >> the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key >> >> (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption >> >> with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK >> >> provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect >> >> forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and >> >> integrity protection. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> The file can be obtained via >> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ >> >> >> >> IESG discussion can be tracked via >> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ballot/ >> >> >> >> >> >> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> TLS mailing list >> >> TLS@ietf.org >> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > TLS mailing list >> > TLS@ietf.org >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > TLS mailing list >> > TLS@ietf.org >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> > >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > TLS mailing list >> > TLS@ietf.org >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls > >
- [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-0… The IESG
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae… Simon Friedberger
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae… Daniel Migault
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae… Timothy Jackson
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae… Daniel Migault
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-ae… Daniel Migault