Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard

["Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[e-mail]>]

Instead of our in addition to the Wiki, check scholarly references. E.g., Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, etc.

Regards,
Uri

Sent from my iPhone

> On May 18, 2017, at 17:18, Daniel Migault <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Hi, 
> 
> Thanks Tim and Uri for the comment. At least wikipedia considers them as equivalent. I am fine either way, but leave it  as pfs unless there is a consensus to change it to forward secrecy. If having fs seems important to you please let us know asap!
> 
> Yours, 
> Daniel 
> 
>> On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> It is a mathematical cryptographic term, and as such is incontrovertible.
>> 
>> I say leave it in.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> Uri
>> 
>> Sent from my iPhone
>> 
>> > On May 18, 2017, at 16:58, Timothy Jackson <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> >
>> > One small nit.
>> >
>> >> ECDHE provides perfect forward secrecy
>> > I thought we had decided to change “perfect forward secrecy” to just “forward secrecy” since “perfect” is such a difficult standard to reach?
>> >
>> > Tim
>> > —
>> > Tim Jackson | Product Security Architect | MobileIron, Inc.
>> >
>> > On 5/18/17, 10:45 AM, "TLS on behalf of Daniel Migault" <[e-mail] on behalf of [e-mail]> wrote:
>> >
>> >    Hi Simon,
>> >
>> >    Thank you for the review. I believe we have addressed your comments in our version 04. Please see my comments inline.
>> >
>> >    Yours,
>> >    Daniel
>> >
>> >    -----Original Message-----
>> >    From: TLS [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of Simon Friedberger
>> >    Sent: Thursday, May 04, 2017 5:59 PM
>> >    To: [e-mail]
>> >    Cc: [e-mail]
>> >    Subject: Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> (ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to Proposed Standard
>> >
>> >    Nits:
>> >
>> >        RFC 4279 reference is missing.
>> >    MGLT: It seems the reference is mentioned in the current version in the Normative reference as well  as in the introduction at line 127,  in section 3 line 143. In case you meant another reference, please let us know.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >        "TLS 1.3 and above version, " should probably be "TLS 1.3 and above" or "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
>> >    MGLT: Changed to "TLS 1.3 and higher versions"
>> >
>> >>    On 04/05/17 18:41, The IESG wrote:
>> >> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG
>> >> (tls) to consider the following document:
>> >> - 'ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
>> >>   Security (TLS)'
>> >>  <draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt> as Proposed Standard
>> >>
>> >> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
>> >> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>> >> [e-mail] mailing lists by 2017-05-18. Exceptionally, comments may
>> >> be sent to [e-mail] instead. In either case, please retain the
>> >> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>> >>
>> >> Abstract
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>   This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
>> >>   Layer Security (TLS) protocol.  The cipher suites are all based on
>> >>   the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key
>> >>   (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption
>> >>   with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM.  PSK
>> >>   provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect
>> >>   forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and
>> >>   integrity protection.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> The file can be obtained via
>> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/
>> >>
>> >> IESG discussion can be tracked via
>> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead/ballot/
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
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