Re: [TLS] Final nail in the coffin for cleartext SNI/ALPN in TLS 1.3

[Ralf Skyper Kaiser <[e-mail]>]

On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 4:39 PM, Watson Ladd <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 8:32 AM, Ralf Skyper Kaiser <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > 1. Meta-data is important. Meta-data tells a lot about a person.
> > Meta-data can get a user killed or worse. Transmitting the host-name
> > (meta-data) in clear in TLS is not good (as in ‘not good because it
> > can get you killed’ and there is no alternative for the user – unless
> > the user is a tech-wizard.).
> They can use Tor. They need to anyway: reverse DNS lookups are not
> rocket science.
>

[...]

>
> > There are other ways how an adversary can extract the same meta-data.
> > This should not deter us from fixing it in TLS. Maybe we will find a
> > solution for the other problems as well (like confidential DNS).
> No, the other problem is you connect to the server and ask it to show
> you a page,
> and learn what the server is. The sole exception is multihosting,
> which is getting
> less common for various reasons.
>

As a hacker I would love TLS to leak the host information. It would enable
me
to find out which user connects to admin.blubb.com and who connects just to
www.blubb.com (both domains hosted on same server).

Your comments are wrong in this scenario: Connecting to the server does not
help
the hacker to gain above information. Neither does reverse lookup.

TLS leaks it and there is no other way the hacker would get this
information if
TLS would not leak it. Transport Layer Kind-off-Security protocol is the
problem.



regards,

ralf