[TLS] Re: [lamps] Re: Re: Re: TLS Client Certificates; a survey

[Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Mar 31, 2026 at 8:00 PM David Adrian <[e-mail]> wrote:


> History has taught us that commingling PKI use cases causes more harm than
> good. It is a consistent security problem when PKI hierarchies intended for
> public web sites get entangled in non-web use cases. As an example, such
> behavior slowed the deprecation of SHA-1 in 2018 because payment card
> terminal implementations and their corresponding root stores could not be
> updated.
>

The original concept of X.509v3/PKIX was that there were two types of
certificate, certificate signing certificates and end entity certificates.
While there are certainly very good arguments for cryptographic hygiene and
use of separate private keys for separate applications, that only leads us
to separation of concerns between end-entity certificates.

I would have rather more sympathy for the position of the browser providers
in 2018 if they had not been so intractably opposed to adding support for
SHA-2 back when I was pushing for that in 2002. The transition from MD5 to
SHA-1 had only been possible because the browsers already supported SHA-1
and it was clear that we would be in a mess if SHA-1 failed long before the
2005 RSA announcement which rather than spurring deployment of SHA-2 caused
many to decide that we should instead wait for SHA-3.

The problem we faced as CAs was that nobody would be able to make use of
SHA-2 certificates until they were widely supported in the browsers so it
really didn't make sense for the browser providers to block on CA support.

In the event, a certain browser provider flipped from being non commital in
their plans to add support to insisting the problem was so severe we had to
do transition immediately. So no, I don't draw the same conclusions.


As to applying the 'commingling' argument to roots, I am rather surprised
because root certificates aren't really certificates at all in PKIX terms.
While they are presented as self signed certificates, that is really just a
syntactic convenience that avoided having to define a new structure. The
signature on a root certificate doesn't have meaning after it has been
installed in a root store so whether it is SHA-1, SHA-2 or MD4 makes little
real difference.

No, I cannot see a good argument for Web client and Web server certificates
being separate applications not to be commingled.