[TLS] Re: [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Re: Re: Re: TLS Client Certificates; a survey

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Wed, 01 April 2026 22:52 UTC

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Date: Wed, 01 Apr 2026 17:52:44 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Re: Re: Re: TLS Client Certificates; a survey
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On Wed, Apr 01, 2026 at 10:05:31PM +0000, Andrei Popov wrote:
> > Given that it's not, and that uses existed, and users have been
> > negatively impacted by a policy that was never publicized in the
> > right places and for which no public comment was allowed, the only
> > fair question is the original.
>
> In Google's defense, it's a policy for their own TRP; I would not
> expect public comment on corporate policy.

It's a policy that they impose by sheer market force on third parties.
That brings in questions of antitrust laws and policy.

> > Typically applications that support client certificates will have a
> > list of client _names_ that are allowed to access the service, or
> > some other form of authorization ultimately keyed by the client's
> > authenticated name.  Applications that do not support client
> > certificates will simply ignore client certificates.
>
> Understood; the problem is that client names aren't scoped globally
> like Web server names, so conflicts are possible, leading to client
> impersonation.

Have I not mentioned at least once that I'm specifically referring to
dNSName SAN certificates?  Those are "scoped globally like Web server
names".

> > What I am objecting to is the subsequent disappearance of a product
> > from the market which was an indirect consequence of the policy
> > change, and that disappearance is leading people to engage in
> > workarounds that effectively defeat the policy change but in a way
> > that is a net negative to the Internet.  The policy change has
> > simply backfired and needs revision.
>
> Just to clarify: the net negative you're referring to is that an extra
> certificate hierarchy (for client-only certs) needs to be configured
> on certain deployed TLS clients?

No, that would be ok.  I'm talking about the disappearance of options
for getting clientAuth dNSName SAN certificates.

Though someone just wrote me off-list that:

| I know at least of GlobalSign Client Authentication Root R45 and
| GlobalSign Client Authentication Root E45 (but have no experience with
| them).
|
| https://support.globalsign.com/ca-certificates/root-certificates/globalsign-root-certificates

So perhaps not all CAs have exited that market.  But this is just their
root certificates; I've not yet found how to get a client certificate
from them nor how much it costs.

Nico
--