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Re: [TLS] Do we need DH?

Fedor Brunner <fedor.brunner@azet.sk> Mon, 29 December 2014 12:02 UTC

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Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 13:02:02 +0100
From: Fedor Brunner <fedor.brunner@azet.sk>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Do we need DH?
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On 28.12.2014 23:38, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Dear all,
> 
> I invite you to consider the following interesting sources
> 
> http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35511.pdf
> http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35510.pdf
> 
> These show that the NSA has a comparatively easy time exploiting static RSA.
> 
>>From this it seems that performance actually matters: the slow speed
> of DH exchange compared to ECC explains why ECC, and not DH is
> replacing RSA. DH is also being attacked by PHOENIX: I can wild mass
> guess that this is batch FFS: I don't know if this has been researched
> extensively, and even batch NFS has only an asymptotic analysis.
> 
> Given the low usage of the DH handshake, and potential vulnerabilities
> (not potential, but certainly not as well understood) should we keep
> it in TLS 1.3?
> 
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd
> 
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
> 

http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35537.pdf

NSA is very carefully watching all crypto, metadata and SIGINT related
development at IETF.

For example:
"New session policy extensions may improve our ability to passively
target two sided communications," says a brief write-up of an IETF
meeting in San Diego on an NSA-internal Wiki.

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