Re: [TLS] On Curve25519 and other possibilities (e.g. ietf256p, ietf384p, ietf521p,

[Watson Ladd <[e-mail]>]

On Jun 28, 2014 3:55 PM, "Michael StJohns" <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> On 6/28/2014 6:24 PM, Salz, Rich wrote:
>>>
>>> *sigh* If the IETF is really going to get into the business of
standardizing
>>> > crypto, we need to get the process for doing so right the first time
rather
>>> > than just plugging it in to TLS and hoping we don't have to redo it
over and
>>> > over again.
>>
>> Agree.  But again, it's "back into the business"  Because we did it
before with TLS1, IPsec, and ECC curves therein.
>
>
> Um... huh?  Can you provide specifics about which cryptographic
algorithms  we standardized?  This is news to me.

Camellia, RC4, HMAC. Of course we still screwed up TLS 1.0 by ignoring
lessons from IPSEC.

>
> And I'm not talking about "here's how you use ECDSA for TLS or ECDH for
for IPSEC" documents, but something comparable to SP800-56A or FIPS186-4 or
X9.63.

What's magical about ANSI? Furthermore,  we aren't developing an algorithm,
but documenting one that already exists, the way RFC 6090 claimed to.

There is nothing magical that makes using AES secure. You always have to
know what you are doing.

So I don't see picking curve25519 as inherently riskier then decisions we
make every day in this WG.
>
> Mike
>
>
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