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[TLS] Re: draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement

"D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to> Fri, 06 December 2024 17:29 UTC

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Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2024 17:29:06 -0000
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From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement
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Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) writes:
> I understand that people want to discuss the hybrid KEM draft more
> (because there are more options there) - can we at least get the less
> controversial part done?

See https://blog.cr.yp.to/20240102-hybrid.html. Using just PQ, rather
than ECC+PQ, would incur security risks without improving deployment.
Regarding "less controversial", you might have missed previous TLS WG
messages such as

    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/j1qkfNmk33OZ7hgCR53TiLmYOiA/
    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/I1GPuKLCBJ3jA-ovNcuIsLlNGkM/
    https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/gB55YMMdfFLqaCE9ughNXX8qjtA/

where various people (including me, obviously) already objected. Also,
you might have missed BSI writing in

    https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/TechGuidelines/TG02102/BSI-TR-02102-1.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

that its post-quantum KEM recommendations are only "in combination with
a classical key derivation mechanism"; commentator Matt Green writing in

    https://x.com/matthew_d_green/status/1742521204026622011

that NSA's "stance against hybrid encryption makes absolutely zero
sense"; and NSA itself in

    https://web.archive.org/web/20220524232250/https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/75/documents/resources/everyone/csfc/threat-prevention.pdf

asking for two cryptographic layers "to mitigate the ability of an
adversary to exploit a single cryptographic implementation".

---D. J. Bernstein

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