Re: [TLS] TLS1.3
"Lewis, Nick" <nick.lewis@usa.g4s.com> Thu, 07 February 2013 14:10 UTC
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From: "Lewis, Nick" <nick.lewis@usa.g4s.com>
To: 'Peter Gutmann' <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Thu, 07 Feb 2013 14:10:16 +0000
Thread-Topic: [TLS] TLS1.3
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3
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>>Padding the plain text up to a multiple of the cipher block size (minus >>the hash size) ahead of doing the MAC is a more modest change that may >>be more widely applicable to existing cipher suites - with a "pad-then >>MAC" client hello >That won't help against the current attack. My understanding is that the current attack is due to the MAC revealing the length of the plaintext. If the plaintext is pre-padded to a full crypt block then a MAC can reveal no more than does the ciphertext itself Nick The details of this company are as follows: G4S Technology Limited, Registered Office: Challenge House, International Drive, Tewkesbury, Gloucestershire GL20 8UQ, Registered in England No. 2382338. This communication may contain information which is confidential, personal and/or privileged. It is for the exclusive use of the intended recipient(s). If you are not the intended recipient(s), please note that any distribution, forwarding, copying or use of this communication or the information in it is strictly prohibited. Any personal views expressed in this e-mail are those of the individual sender and the company does not endorse or accept responsibility for them. Prior to taking any action based upon this e-mail message, you should seek appropriate confirmation of its authenticity. This e-mail has been scanned for all viruses by MessageLabs.
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Peter Gutmann
- [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Dan Harkins
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 David McGrew (mcgrew)
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0558 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Lewis, Nick
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Wan-Teh Chang
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Scott Schmit
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Scott Schmit
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.3 Peter Gutmann