Re: [TLS] TLS1.3

Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com> Sat, 16 February 2013 00:10 UTC

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Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 16:10:04 -0800
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From: Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.3
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On Mon, Feb 11, 2013 at 3:13 PM, Peter Gutmann
<pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
>
> In what way would HMAC-MD5 be "too weak"?  I agree that HMAC-SHA1/
> SHA256 are a better proposition, but using HMAC-MD5 should be up to
> the implementer in any case. I've deprecated it for some years now, the
> minimum I'll do is HMAC-SHA1.  It's not as if there's a shortage of suites
> to choose from, and I've never found anything that does only -MD5 and
> not -SHA1.

There are some websites that enable only one cipher suite:
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5. You can find some examples in this Chromium
bug report: https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118330

Wan-Teh