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Re: [TLS] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis-09.txt

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Tue, 15 June 2010 18:22 UTC

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 14:22:03 -0400
Thread-Topic: [TLS] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis-09.txt
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Subject: Re: [TLS] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tls-rfc4366-bis-09.txt
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On 6/15/10 2:26 , "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
> Why not allow encrypt-then-MAC to be negotiated in an extension?  This is a
> really trivial change to existing code (arguably it could have been done for
> TLS 1.2, since that incompatibly changes lots of the other crypto as well),
> and means it'd follow encrypt-then-MAC best practice for security.

Strictly speaking there is a difference between authenticating the plaintext
and then encrypting it, and authenticating the ciphertext.

In practice, particularly for protocols such as TLS (and SNMP where
encrypt-then-authenticate was done first in IETF), it should be OK.

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