Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)

Hi Rob,

No, this update does not add new ECDHE_RSA cipher suites. However, I would not rule out the possibility of implementing TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA*384* in a future update.

(In any case, I would not read too much into "Historically we have opted to provide ECDHE *in place of* classic DHE". IMHO, both DHE and ECDHE have their place and we'll keep adding support for the cipher suites our customers need.)

Cheers,

Andrei 

-----Original Message-----
From: Rob Stradling [mailto:rob.stradling@comodo.com] 
Sent: Monday, March 31, 2014 3:36 AM
To: Andrei Popov; Daniel Kahn Gillmor; Marsh Ray; Martin Thomson
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)

On 28/03/14 19:03, Andrei Popov wrote:
>> did SChannel ever support classic DHE with RSA authentication?
>
> "Windows RT 8.1, Windows 8.1, and Windows Server 2012 R2 update spring 2014" adds a couple of DHE_RSA cipher suites:
> TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
> TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Andrei, may we therefore assume that "Windows RT 8.1, Windows 8.1, and Windows Server 2012 R2 update spring 2014" will also add these 2 ciphers...

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256

?

(Marsh wrote "Historically we have opted to provide ECDHE *in place of* classic DHE".  I'm trying to figure out if this is still your approach, or if you're now doing the opposite!)

Thanks.

> Without this update, schannel supports DHE_DSS (admittedly, not the most widely used auth).
>
> Cheers,
>
> Andrei
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Daniel Kahn 
> Gillmor
> Sent: Friday, March 28, 2014 6:26 AM
> To: Marsh Ray; Martin Thomson
> Cc: tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming 
> Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)
>
> On 03/27/2014 08:17 PM, Marsh Ray wrote:
>> From: Martin Thomson [mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com]
>>>
>>> On 27 March 2014 16:55, Marsh Ray <maray@microsoft.com> wrote:
>>>> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Alyssa Rowan
>>>>>
>>>>> Show of hands: who *really* wants to deploy 2048-bit (or above) DHE, when they could have curve25519 instead?
>>>>
>>>> The general consensus at Microsoft is that we like ECDHE much better than the classic DHE.
>>>
>>> I think that this is the general trend, but is it so bad that you would want to prohibit DHE?
>>
>> Historically we have opted to provide ECDHE *in place of* classic DHE.
>
> did SChannel ever support classic DHE with RSA authentication?
>
>   
> http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa380512%28v=v
> s.85%29.aspx
>
> suggests that XP and win2003 (which, afaict, were what immediately preceded vista) does not have DHE.  So it looks like ECDHE was just added, but "classic DHE" wasn't in SChannel in the first place, which doesn't sound like ECDHE is "in place of" DHE to me.
>
> or am i misreading the documentation?
>
> 	--dkg
>
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>

--
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online
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