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Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)

Marsh Ray <maray@microsoft.com> Fri, 28 March 2014 00:17 UTC

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From: Marsh Ray <maray@microsoft.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)
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Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 00:17:27 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)
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From: Martin Thomson [mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com] 
>
> On 27 March 2014 16:55, Marsh Ray <maray@microsoft.com> wrote:
> > From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Alyssa Rowan
> >>
> >> Show of hands: who *really* wants to deploy 2048-bit (or above) DHE, when they could have curve25519 instead?
> >
> > The general consensus at Microsoft is that we like ECDHE much better than the classic DHE.
>
> I think that this is the general trend, but is it so bad that you would want to prohibit DHE?

Historically we have opted to provide ECDHE *in place of* classic DHE.

- Marsh

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ff468651(v=vs.85).aspx
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv
Schannel Cipher Suites in Windows Vista

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P521
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P521
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P521
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P521
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5

The following cipher suites are supported by Schannel; however, they are not present by default. They must be added as necessary. For information about how to add cipher suites to the Schannel provider, see Prioritizing Schannel Cipher Suites.
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA
TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_MD5
SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

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