Re: [TLS] [tls13-spec] relax certificate_list ordering requirements to match current practice (#169)

Fabrice Gautier <fabrice.gautier@gmail.com> Tue, 12 May 2015 23:04 UTC

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From: Fabrice Gautier <fabrice.gautier@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 12 May 2015 16:04:05 -0700
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [tls13-spec] relax certificate_list ordering requirements to match current practice (#169)
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On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 6:58 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 6:14 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
>> Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>>>
>>> 1) I think clients, such as Martin's, that implement normative checking of
>>> ordering and are used for the Internet at large (e.g. between servers and
>>> clients that are not controlled by a single entity) are bad for Internet
>>> security.
>>
>> Huh?  I never described anything like that "normative checking".
>>
>> My client simply feeds the certificate chain from the TLS Certificate
>> handshake message, up to an issure that is recognized as trust anchor
>> directly into the certificate path validation function (rfc5280,
>> section 6.1) just like rfc5246 and rfc5280 _designed_ this to be.
>
> How does the server know which trust anchors will be accepted,
> particularly in cases involving cross-validation?


Isn't that the purpose of the "Trusted CA Indication" extension in RFC 6066 ?

I don't know of anything implementing it though....


-- Fabrice