Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-00

Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Thu, 29 January 2015 10:18 UTC

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 11:18:44 +0100
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Working Group Last Call for draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-00
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On Thursday 29 January 2015 00:10:09 Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 28, 2015 at 08:06:32AM +0000, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> > Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> writes:
> > >Is it at all practical to publish an TLS RFC stating intent to deprecate
> > >TLS 1.0/1.1 within some fixed timeframe? I think everyone would rather
> > >phase it out then have to "be the hitman" each time.
> > 
> > I'm happy to have 1.0 phased out, but I'd make the baseline 1.1, not 1.2. 
> > 1.1 fixes the major issues with SSL (no support for extensions, no
> > per-message IV) without being a major rewrite like 1.2 is.  There's an
> > awful lot of stuff outside of the browser world that can move to 1.1 if
> > it isn't there already, but that's going to take a long, long time to
> > move to 1.2 if it ever does. Killing 1.0 (which is really just SSL
> > IETF-ised) is a pretty straightforward step if you're already getting rid
> > of SSL because it has most of the same problems, but deprecating 1.1 is
> > going a bit too far.
> 
> For
> some reason 1.2 actually seems to better support than 1.1.  There
> are a strange set of servers out there that support 1.0 and 1.2
> but not 1.1.

bug in openssl, SSL_OP_ALL from OpenSSL 1.0.0 did include SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 
when run against OpenSSL 1.0.1:
https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2802&user=guest&pass=guest

which you should know, given that you have submitted the above bug report ;)

-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario