Re: [v6ops] [IPv6] [OPSEC] Why folks are blocking IPv6 extension headers? (Episode 1000 and counting) (Linux DoS)

Ole Troan <otroan@employees.org> Mon, 22 May 2023 14:37 UTC

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From: Ole Troan <otroan@employees.org>
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Date: Mon, 22 May 2023 16:36:48 +0200
Cc: Andrew Campling <andrew.campling@419.consulting>, IPv6 Operations <v6ops@ietf.org>, "opsec@ietf.org" <opsec@ietf.org>, 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>, Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
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To: Tom Herbert <tom=40herbertland.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [v6ops] [IPv6] [OPSEC] Why folks are blocking IPv6 extension headers? (Episode 1000 and counting) (Linux DoS)
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Tom,

> The problem is in public networks where the service provider acts as
> "anonymous big brother" to enforce its concept of security to
> "protect" the users. While I'm sure they'd like us to think that they
> are acting for the benefit of the users and it's for the "good of the
> Internet", the reality is that having a patchwork of random security
> policies across the Internet is counterproductive, and, frankly, some
> of these policies are driven more by localized business interests
> rather than the users' best interests.
> 
> As a host and networking stack developer, I view the network and these
> arbitrary inconsistent security policies as the problem not as the
> solution to application and host security. The best tool developers
> have is to encrypt as much of the packet as possible to keep network
> providers from meddling in protocol layers they shouldn't be, but
> unfortunately that isn't applicable to all protocols like EH for
> instance (although, given that IPsec was on Fernando's approved list
> of extension headers, I suppose we could hide all the extension
> headers we want in IPsec :-) )

I don’t think Fernando has argued the case that some EHs should be filtered in public transit networks?
In the whole I think it’s not a good idea that the IETF has some working groups working hard at defining new protocols and other working groups working hard at defining policies to block them.

For public transit networks, the IETF could work on describing ‘what is Internet access’. The production declaration if you like. And then regulation  could be used to enforce that. We’d need encryption too I’m sure.

Now for EHs in general. Their functionality of providing a separate signalling channel independent of the application… it might be time that we accept that this was a bad idea. Which deployment status has confirmed.


Best regards,
Ole