Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback

"Salvatore D'Agostino" <sal@idmachines.com> Tue, 04 August 2015 01:24 UTC

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From: Salvatore D'Agostino <sal@idmachines.com>
To: 'Nat Sakimura' <sakimura@gmail.com>, 'Joanne Knight' <Joanne.Knight@dia.govt.nz>
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Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2015 21:24:29 -0400
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Cc: 'Jim Fenton' <fenton@bluepopcorn.net>, 'Rainer Hoerbe' <rainer@hoerbe.at>, 'Justin Richer' <jricher@mit.edu>, vot@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback
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+1

 

From: vot [mailto:vot-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Nat Sakimura
Sent: Monday, August 03, 2015 9:14 PM
To: Joanne Knight
Cc: Jim Fenton; Rainer Hoerbe; Justin Richer; vot@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback

 

Hi. 

 

I think X.1254 | ISO/IEC 29115 is actually quite good if you read deeply into it especially from private sector point of view. It has departed from the government centric approach as it should be as an industry standard, and the applicability was widened considerably. 

 

What's really good about it is its departure from the notion that identity is {name, dob, address + some other attributes}. It is policy based so that the policy in the framework should decide what needs to be verified to achieve "identity proofing." In the private sector usage, it may just be a validity of payment instrument and contact method. 

 

29115 is not being reviewed at this time. There is an SP but it is just an SP (study period) and not review. Review is supposed to start in December 2016. 

 

Sort of assertion presentation has been in SP800-63 for sometime. 

In the most recent one [SP800-63], it is clause 9. 

 

 

[SP800-63]  http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf, 

 

 

 

2015-08-04 9:05 GMT+09:00 Joanne Knight <Joanne.Knight@dia.govt.nz>:

ISO/IEC 29115 has been nothing but a headache for me for a number of years.

 

If we want to be evolutionary I would not constrain myself to trying to be consistent with it – especially since it is currently being reviewed. I have also suggested that it look this way ;-) rather than the other way around.

 

I am still out to lunch on Assertion Presentation. Just because it exists in my framework and has (thanks to Justin) got a label, I have not had time to think through exactly what it is and means. It may be that it is a series of aspects that must be added to the other Vectors. They may not be measurable, in which case they become guidance.

 

As it was Nat who lit the spark that there is this other ‘thing’ in the mix, I am hoping for a flu free ISO meeting to have an academic brainstorm. Jim, I seem to have missed your review of I-D, so would appreciate if you can send me your thoughts on Assertion Presentation.

 

Cheers

 

Joanne

 

From: Jim Fenton [mailto:fenton@bluepopcorn.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, 4 August 2015 10:32 a.m.
To: Nat Sakimura; Rainer Hoerbe
Cc: vot@ietf.org; Justin Richer
Subject: Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback

 

To be entirely consistent with ISO/IEC 29115, we would need to rename Identity Proofing as Enrolment, and Credential Usage as Authentication.

But ISO/IEC 29115 refers to these as phases: they occur at different times (or, in the case of Credential Management, over a long period of time) and have different threat models. But I would like to ask under which circumstances a Relying Party would act differently to an indication of less secure Credential Management vs. less secure Authentication. There are credential management practices that would make a credential unsuitable for highly secure authentication, but why not just represent that as less secure authentication? VoT should be only as complex as required; it should not represent aspects of the process that the relying party does not need.

Also, Enrolment includes aspects of the credentialing process that go far beyond identity proofing and the binding of those attributes in a credential. It's the reliability of that attribute assertion that's orthogonal to authentication strength, and not all of the other aspects of enrolment.

Finally, I'll repeat my comment that's buried in my review of the I-D the other day that Assertion Presentation should be visible to the RP already. For example, if the assertion is encrypted in transit, the RP will know that without being told. There may be need for the RP to specify how it wants assertions to be presented to it, but that seems like more of a general option to me and not part of the Vector.

-Jim

On 8/2/15 2:59 AM, Nat Sakimura wrote:

I agree that we should split out the credential management and the credential usage.  

Each should have different "grades". 

 

Right now, -00 has: 

 


3.1. Identity Proofing 
3.2. Credential Management
3.3. Assertion Presentation 

 

Instead, it could be

 

3.1 Identity Proofing

3.2 Credential Management

3.3 Credential Usage

3.4 Assertion Presentation

 

Then, 3.1 - 3.3 aligns with X.1254 and ISO/IEC 29115, which is good. 

Note: they are missing 3.4. 

 

We also need to define vtm. 

I imagine that vtm uri would point to the policy documents of the trust framework, 

but that is not explicitly there. 

 

Best, 

 

Nat

 

 

 





 

-- 

Nat Sakimura (=nat)

Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en