Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback
Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net> Mon, 03 August 2015 22:31 UTC
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To: Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>, Rainer Hoerbe <rainer@hoerbe.at>
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From: Jim Fenton <fenton@bluepopcorn.net>
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Cc: "vot@ietf.org" <vot@ietf.org>, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback
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To be entirely consistent with ISO/IEC 29115, we would need to rename Identity Proofing as Enrolment, and Credential Usage as Authentication. But ISO/IEC 29115 refers to these as phases: they occur at different times (or, in the case of Credential Management, over a long period of time) and have different threat models. But I would like to ask under which circumstances a Relying Party would act differently to an indication of less secure Credential Management vs. less secure Authentication. There are credential management practices that would make a credential unsuitable for highly secure authentication, but why not just represent that as less secure authentication? VoT should be only as complex as required; it should not represent aspects of the process that the relying party does not need. Also, Enrolment includes aspects of the credentialing process that go far beyond identity proofing and the binding of those attributes in a credential. It's the reliability of that attribute assertion that's orthogonal to authentication strength, and not all of the other aspects of enrolment. Finally, I'll repeat my comment that's buried in my review of the I-D the other day that Assertion Presentation should be visible to the RP already. For example, if the assertion is encrypted in transit, the RP will know that without being told. There may be need for the RP to specify how it wants assertions to be presented to it, but that seems like more of a general option to me and not part of the Vector. -Jim On 8/2/15 2:59 AM, Nat Sakimura wrote: > I agree that we should split out the credential management and the > credential usage. > Each should have different "grades". > > Right now, -00 has: > > 3.1. Identity Proofing > 3.2. Credential Management > 3.3. Assertion Presentation > > > Instead, it could be > > 3.1 Identity Proofing > 3.2 Credential Management > 3.3 Credential Usage > 3.4 Assertion Presentation > > Then, 3.1 - 3.3 aligns with X.1254 and ISO/IEC 29115, which is good. > Note: they are missing 3.4. > > We also need to define vtm. > I imagine that vtm uri would point to the policy documents of the > trust framework, > but that is not explicitly there. > > Best, > > Nat > >
- [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Joanne Knight
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Rainer Hoerbe
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Justin Richer
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Rainer Hoerbe
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Nat Sakimura
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Jim Fenton
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Ira McDonald
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Nat Sakimura
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Joanne Knight
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Nat Sakimura
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Nat Sakimura
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Salvatore D'Agostino
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Rainer Hoerbe
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback sakimura
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback sakimura
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Nat Sakimura
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Patrick Curry
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Justin Richer
- Re: [VoT] Vectors of Trust I-D feedback Jim Fenton