Re: [Acme] kinds of proof

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Fri, 28 November 2014 13:25 UTC

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Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 13:25:09 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] kinds of proof
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On 28/11/14 13:21, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> It is not clear to me that the form of the proof needs to be hard
> coded into the enrollment protocol. It should certainly be possible to
> layer in additional validation steps to support stronger validation.

Entirely correct. However, what I'm most interested in (for now)
is the by-default case that e.g. might be used when one installs
a web server. And support for that case probably does need to be
baked in so that a web server install script can just work.

S.


> 
> On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 5:20 AM, Stephen Farrell
> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>
>> changing subject line to the interesting bit...
>>
>> On 27/11/14 21:13, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>>> I agree that the wire format (syntax) is less important than the
>>> feature set (semantics).  In particular, there I'd like to see some
>>> discussion of what kind of "proofs of control" should be acceptable
>>> with a lights-out DV certification authority.
>>
>> Yep. Fully agree about DV. But DV isn't the only kind of
>> validation I'd like to be supported here.
>>
>> I'd like if it were possible to extend that to include cases
>> where one has control over the web server, but not the DNS.
>>
>> Now there are dangers in that so I'm not sure if it's really
>> doable, but I've controlled web servers below tcd.ie for years
>> (e.g. [1]), without any control over DNS, and I'd like to be
>> able to do better than self-signed out of the box there too.
>>
>> The current spec [2] seems to allow for that via the "provision
>> a file on the web server" method, but the details of that
>> ("simpleHttps" I guess?) aren't clear. I'm also not sure of
>> the security implications, which could be a killer (for having
>> key authorization depend on this mechanism alone) so I'm sure
>> there's work to be done there.
>>
>> But I'd very much like to just update apache on my servers
>> and have that go get certs that work.
>>
>> S.
>>
>> [1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/yesicanrichard.txt
>> [2]
>> https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec/blob/master/draft-barnes-acme.md
>>
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