Re: [Acme] kinds of proof

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Tue, 02 December 2014 00:05 UTC

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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] kinds of proof
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>> And it is clear to me that they should be, if we want to see more encryption
>> of traffic. I have no problem with some CAs saying "we'll issue you a cert
>> only if you control port X", but I absolutely want that to be a policy of
>> the CA, not of the enrollment protocol.
> 
> Paul, do you have any examples of CAs that accept any port, or are
> you in part making that up?  Comodo for example, requires control
> of port 80:

or dns

randy