[Cfrg] NSA sabotaging crypto standards

["Manger, James" <[e-mail]>]

>> could you take a minimal stand against the sabotage of crypto
>> standards by the NSA. I'm glad other IETF groups are trying to address
>> pervasive surveillance with technical measures, but we also know: the
>> NSA has sabotaged crypto standards; they have not told us which
>> standards bodies or which specifications are affected; they haven't
>> told us the nature of the sabotage. The NSA have tarnished a lot of
>> work by our standards community on improving internet security. In this
>> situation it is totally untenable for an NSA employee to chair this
>> crypto standards group. Make it clear that an organization cannot both
>> sabotage our work and have their employees openly participate in our
>> civil community.

> The CFRG is not a standards group. It does not produce standards.

These look and smell like standards to me, and this is where they are worked on.

draft-irtf-cfrg-advice
draft-irtf-cfrg-augpake
draft-irtf-cfrg-cipher-catalog
draft-irtf-cfrg-cwc
draft-irtf-cfrg-dragonfly
draft-irtf-cfrg-fast-mac-requirements
draft-irtf-cfrg-icm
draft-irtf-cfrg-kdf-uses
draft-irtf-cfrg-ocb
draft-irtf-cfrg-rhash
draft-irtf-cfrg-tmmh
draft-irtf-cfrg-ust
draft-irtf-cfrg-zss
draft-irtf-cfrg-zssbn
draft-mcgrew-aead-*
...


> It's
> discussions and documents may influence IETF standards, but those
> discussions happen in IETF working groups governed by the IETF process.
> This is important, because not all of the IETF rules apply to the IRTF,
> see RFC2014. (For example, IRTF research groups need not come to
> consensus on their output.)
> 
> As an individual, I am fully in favor of making widespread wiretapping
> as difficult and costly as possible, and I am very supportive of
> anything the IETF and IRTF can do here.

NSA have been sabotaging crypto standards. This is separate from widespread wiretapping.

> That said, replacing Kevin Igoe as co-chair of the CFRG is not an
> action that will get us any closer towards that goal.

Removing Kevin Igoe will be a concrete statement that we find the NSA sabotage of crypto standards unacceptable. It will also make it just that bit more difficult and costly for future sabotage of standards.
Not because Kevin is no longer a chair, but by making it just a little bit harder for the NSA to attract budding cryptographers, who will be just a bit more wary of joining the NSA when it might crimp their ability to contribute to forums such as CFRG.

> Please see my
> detailed reply to Trevor for why; the short version is that I don't
> believe that Kevin (or David, for that matter) have any greater
> influence over the output of the research group than other
> participants. They don't have any veto rights, or an ability to
> suppress contributions or discussions, or a way to mandate certain
> outcomes.

Of course chairs have some greater influence, but that it not particularly relevant.
Removing Kevin is a signal about sabotaging standard.

> Our best defense against IRTF and IETF work being subverted is
> transparency, and getting as much review from as diverse a group of
> people as possible.

That is one defence.
Another one is to add one more factor for the NSA to weigh when they next consider sabotaging crypto. If Kevin is removed they are more likely to remember that it harms their remit to improve security, and harms their employees.


> Eliminating groups of people from participating
> because of their current or past employment status, or based on whom
> they consulted for or took research grants from weakens that open
> process.

We are not eliminating groups, we are saying we strongly object to one organization's actual behaviour.
My understanding is that Kevin Igoe is a current employee of the NSA, paid (at least in part) to work on crypto standards.

>past employment status
>consulted for
>took research grants

No one is suggesting anything about those categories.
Listing them feels like an attempt to invoke an imaginary slippery slope as an excuse not to act.

> Lars

--
James Manger