Re: [dane] [saag] Need better opportunistic terminology

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

(Bcc'ing dane and saag for reasons that'll become obvious:-)

On 03/11/2014 09:53 PM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> I prefer that we stick with that definition of the term,
> which is IPsec-specific. 

I don't think we need to face any such constraint at all.
We might choose to, but there's no reason our definitions
need to honor previous ones since any use of the OE term
will conflict with someone's understanding. I also don't
want us to end up with IPsec (or TLS) specific terminology.

> I have suggested "opportunistic keying" as a
> preferred term, since
> its the key management, not the encryption per se, that distinguishes
> other proposed modes of
> operation for IPsec, TLS, etc. The breakout group at the STRINT workshop
> that discussed terminology
> suggested using the term noted above.

I agree the OK term is better for the reasons you state.
(And Pete Resnick likes the idea of OK protocols:-)

If/when we re-do the MPLS thing we'll move to use that
and I think it'll be useful if other folks do too.

And speaking of terminology, I canvassed a few folks last
week and there was reasonable support for doing the draft
that defines these terms within the UTA WG. So I'd suggest
we move the discussion there if that's ok just to try get
it in one place.

S.