Re: [dane] [saag] Need better opportunistic terminology

Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> Wed, 12 March 2014 20:31 UTC

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Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 13:28:42 -0700
From: Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu>
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To: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
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Cc: saag <saag@ietf.org>, dane@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dane] [saag] Need better opportunistic terminology
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On 3/12/2014 1:02 PM, Derek Atkins wrote:
> Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> writes:
>
>> Why not just use the term "unauthenticated encryption", when that's
>> exactly what's happening?
>
> Well, it's not necessarily what's happening.  The data itself might
> still have "integrity protection" (which is a form of authentication.

Yes, and might be inaccessible to anyone except the endpoints that 
negotiated the key too.

So you have a protected exchange both in privacy and integrity, but you 
don't know with whom.

> You're just not authenticating the endpoint, which means you could be
> subject to a MitM attack.  Alternate terms could be "Unauthenticated
> Keying" or "Unauthenticated Key Exchange" which are closer (IMHO) to
> what's going on.

Sure - yes, but neither acronym is desirable, unfortunately.

Unidentified Security?

Joe