Re: [Danish] Charter Text and the Problem Statement

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Mon, 21 June 2021 14:40 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>, "danish@ietf.org" <danish@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 21 Jun 2021 10:40:39 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Danish] Charter Text and the Problem Statement
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Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> wrote:
    >> If you use DANISH, then you don't need to onboard the device
    >> (i.e. enroll it with a new certificate), because you already have secure
    >> access to the correct certificate via DNS(SEC).

    > In the past we used different keys for different purposes. A
    > manufacturer provided key was used for a relatively small number of
    > tasks (typically for obtaining operational keys). For use with
    > application services we used a different key. We used yet another key
    > for firmware updates and again another for attestation.

    > What has changed?

As you know I'm a big proponent of using an IDevID with an onboarding
protocol to obtain an LDevID.
I think that this is still an important path.  But, it's not the only path!

While I think your next comment might be about divergent paths causing market
confusion,  I think that we are already there.   There are presently a number
of incompatible systems out there that deliver keys from the factory to be
used in production.

I think that the DANISH might be an interesting way to publish *LDevID*s.
While I might onboard a device into my network, in the future, imagine that
different operational networks might need to interact without having an
ownership relationship.  For instance, any personal wearables you might have
interacting with a variety of building or vehicle systems that you are in.
How will I give you permission to turn on the lights in my house?
I'd surely prefer to list that authorization by DNS name, rather than hash,
right?

--
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        |    IoT architect   [
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [




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Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
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