Re: [dmarc-ietf] Response to a claim in draft-crocker-dmarc-author-00 security considerations

Dave Crocker <dcrocker@gmail.com> Sun, 19 July 2020 15:04 UTC

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To: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <superuser@gmail.com>
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From: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@gmail.com>
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Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 08:04:14 -0700
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Response to a claim in draft-crocker-dmarc-author-00 security considerations
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On 7/18/2020 9:23 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 18, 2020 at 6:32 PM Dave Crocker <dcrocker@gmail.com 
> <mailto:dcrocker@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     If end users do not reliably make trust decisions based on /any/
>     of the
>     information in the rfc5322.From field, then how is this question
>     important.  It seems to be seeking precise data about something that
>     isn't even secondary.
>
>
> Google strikes me as the kind of place that would make a decision 
> about what to show users based on

Perhaps, but since we don't have their data and we don't have their 
decision-criteria -- which might be quite different from what is needed 
here -- then it's probably a good idea not to make assumptions about the 
utility, nor to put all of the human factors marbles in the google camp.


>    I'm less convinced by the notion that all of the RFC5322.From is 
> disregarded by the preponderance of users when deciding what level of 
> trust to put in the message's content. That suggests we blindly open 
> and read absolutely everything, and I suspect that isn't the case.

1. That's not what it suggests, at all

2. No doubt there is a better way to put this, but I'm not thinking of 
it, and this isn't just my second thought on the challenge, but quite a 
bit more than that:  This demonstrates why the IETF is a very poor venue 
for conducting human factors discussions.

Again: There is quite a bit of experience demonstrating that providing 
trust indicators to end users does not produce reliable -- ie, useful -- 
decision-making by end users.

d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net