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Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Authentication in draft-ietf-dprive-opportunistic-adotq

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> Wed, 17 February 2021 03:51 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
CC: "dprive@ietf.org" <dprive@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Ext] [dns-privacy] Authentication in draft-ietf-dprive-opportunistic-adotq
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Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2021 03:51:00 +0000
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Authentication in draft-ietf-dprive-opportunistic-adotq
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On Feb 16, 2021, at 6:41 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, 15 Feb 2021, Paul Wouters wrote:
> 
>> Here is a different sentinel:
>> 
>> _53._dns.ns0.example.com. IN TLSA x y z <base64ofCert>
>> 
>> Then do (D)TLS
>> 
>> Now you can choose:
>> 
>> 1) Use DNS(SEC) for validation
>> 2) Use WebPKI[*] for validation
>> 3) TOFU
>> 4) Take at face value
> 
> as PaulH pointed out, the TLSA RFC does not allow one to accept a TLSA
> RRset without DNSSEC signature protection. To allow for deployment
> without DNSSEC, you could instead use the CERT RRtype that has no such
> requirement.

Well, not exactly. (Yes, I said that to PaulW when we were talking, but I was not being precise.)

RFC 6698 both defines the TLSA RRtype and a protocol to use it. The protocol defined in RFC 6698 indeed requires the TLSA record to be validated with DNSSSEC. However, a new protocol, such as one here, could use the TLSA record type in a different protocol, such as the one PaulW has above. The document that defines that protocol would have to be completely clear about what it was doing and why.

--PaulH

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