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Re: [dns-privacy] Authentication in draft-ietf-dprive-opportunistic-adotq

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 16 February 2021 17:44 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 09:43:52 -0800
Message-ID: <CABcZeBMgRFCff4r55iYv6wG7hZCeHgiD7j8ukydeR2975BGkAg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>, dprive@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Authentication in draft-ietf-dprive-opportunistic-adotq
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On Tue, Feb 16, 2021 at 9:01 AM Ben Schwartz <bemasc=
40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

>
>
> I think the scary part is that an authenticated TLS failure (due to
> misconfiguration, bug, overload, or rollback) results in an outage
>

Why is this scary? We have ample evidence that it's possible to run high
availability services using TLS at much larger scale than pretty much any
authoritative server.  I realize that this is outside of the experience of
some [0] DNS operators, but it's not like the knowledge isn't out there.

-Ekr

[0] Though not all. Cloudflare, for instance, runs an authoritative service.

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