Re: [DNSOP] my dnse vision

Tim Wicinski <> Wed, 05 March 2014 11:14 UTC

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Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2014 11:13:51 +0000
From: Tim Wicinski <>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] my dnse vision
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This is some good summarizing.  With your solution, you don't mention 
UDP. I would consider the lack of UDP an issue with moving forward at 
least for wide deployment.  Others seem to think otherwise.

I'd be interested in hearing opinions on this.

The WG will help us chair form the discussion, but I still feel there is 
a need for a more formalized problem statement. Stephane's draft goes a 
long way, do we think it covers all the bases?


On 3/5/14, 11:07 AM, Francis Dupont wrote:
> >From discussions with Stephane Bortzmeyer and Mark Andrews...
> First I come back to the fact there are two different problems
> (aka divide and conquer):
>   * stubs <-> resolver
>   * resolver <-> auth servers
> I consider the first one to be already solved, cf. the Microsoft
> deployed solution which puts clients, local networks, the resolver
> (also the Microsoft Domain Server :-), in the same area and uses
> IPsec to protect it. You can do other ways but IMHO we can assume
> you don't need confidentiality with far or untrusted resolvers.
> Or with other words you don't need confidentiality with
> So we have the second (and *hard*) problem to address.
> A thing we can do now is to minimize qnames (Stephane should
> write a dedicated draft about this): it doesn't change the protocol,
> and IMHO to change referrals by direct queries about name servers
> should not be a bad thing.
> The last step is to design an encryption solution.
> My requirements are:
>   1- the solution SHOULD NOT add extra round trips
>   2- the solution MUST NOT add per client state on servers
>   3- the solution MUST work without prior arrangements
> In details: 1- is about extra delays but for higher level domains
> a validating resolver will anyway make other related requests
> so the extra delays will be diluted.
>   2- is about scalability and anycast, e.g., we want the solution
> to work with a common setup where requests are load-balanced
> between multiple server instances. Note the keyword is "state",
> we can accept a state associated with a TCP connection but
> a solution relying on even medium key TTL should be rejected.
>   3- is common sense, and includes circular dependencies if
> for instance the server public key is itself delivered through
> the DNS.
> At the other hand we only need a weak (== not very strong) protection
> against passive attacks, so it doesn't matter that the standard mutually
> authenticated Diffie-Hellman + symmetical A+E cipher doesn't fit.
> Regards
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