Re: [DNSOP] proposal: Covert in-band zone data

Witold Krecicki <wpk@isc.org> Sat, 06 July 2019 23:59 UTC

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To: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
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From: Witold Krecicki <wpk@isc.org>
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Date: Sun, 07 Jul 2019 01:59:50 +0200
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] proposal: Covert in-band zone data
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W dniu 07.07.2019 o 01:46, Joe Abley pisze:
> On Jul 6, 2019, at 19:28, Witold Krecicki <wpk@isc.org> wrote:
> 
>> Exactly - while the things you mentioned are configuration options that
>> are 'human generated', the ZSK rollover should be, in the ideal case,
>> something that happens automatically, without any human intervention.
> 
> It wouldn't necessarily be harmful to be able to update those other
> things automatically, too. Things like master servers and NOTIFY
> targets perhaps change less frequently or predictably than a ZSK, but
> in times of emergency all could benefit from a well-designed,
> automated and secure mechanism to handle changes.
> 
> TSIG secrets are rarely rolled in practice, in my experience, and
> being able to improve upon that also seems useful.
> 
> I still wonder whether what you're proposing really only solves one of
> a wider set of problems, and whether doing it in the DNS really makes
> sense. Perhaps a standardised, out-of-band provisioning protocol would
> be better.
> 
> We might have a need to exchange some other kind of metadata between
> authoritative servers for a zone in the future, eg relating to secure
> transports or privacy. The idea of being able to provide a general
> solution to solve future such problems seems attractive.
> But why put it out-of-band when it can be in-band? This draft is just an
'umbrella' - you can put whatever you want there, and you can be sure it
won't be leaked. There can be a special RR type for master servers - in
COVERT range, there can be a special RR type for TSIG keys - in COVERT
range. It can be used for any type of metadata.
Note: I'm considering adding a 'private' covert range, for
implementation-specific things (just like we have a general 'private' RR
types range).

-- 
Witold