Re: [DNSOP] proposal: Covert in-band zone data

Witold Krecicki <wpk@isc.org> Mon, 08 July 2019 18:47 UTC

Return-Path: <wpk@isc.org>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15D5712067C for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 8 Jul 2019 11:47:03 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fWVVKKHLa127 for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 8 Jul 2019 11:47:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx.pao1.isc.org (mx.pao1.isc.org [149.20.64.53]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D0AC51206FF for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Mon, 8 Jul 2019 11:46:48 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from zmx1.isc.org (zmx1.isc.org [149.20.0.20]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx.pao1.isc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 714823AB000; Mon, 8 Jul 2019 18:46:48 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from zmx1.isc.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by zmx1.isc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 65F24160051; Mon, 8 Jul 2019 18:46:48 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by zmx1.isc.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 53D5616006B; Mon, 8 Jul 2019 18:46:48 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from zmx1.isc.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (zmx1.isc.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id QEHxLcsvRcv8; Mon, 8 Jul 2019 18:46:48 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from [192.168.69.142] (unknown [31.179.189.14]) by zmx1.isc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 376B9160051; Mon, 8 Jul 2019 18:46:47 +0000 (UTC)
To: "Wessels, Duane" <dwessels@verisign.com>
Cc: "dnsop@ietf.org WG" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
References: <20190706213024.GA56650@isc.org> <CAJhMdTMwCiAS+S_j-i3BXPZ=G1zVhAq+YKH07RsDWRgezPhejg@mail.gmail.com> <caa695e7-21e6-9c41-1814-1f4c1d64df7f@isc.org> <CAJhMdTPK3iqg4sF0Kr+jGAXTf2MZ8FAP0DgwQw1kVBHa65wTNA@mail.gmail.com> <191886397.1948062.1562455685612.JavaMail.zimbra@isc.org> <CAJhMdTNvO=TjNUV=6wHwLJB_c+tqwk4zY24jGbi5a0SqdSUsag@mail.gmail.com> <561203a3-7fd9-94cc-5b13-3639b123f8e2@isc.org> <C467FE93-F6CE-4DB4-80E8-654B1485A1F6@hopcount.ca> <BCD5A218-CF1A-4569-B8A2-7BC8B499CC4B@verisign.com>
From: Witold Krecicki <wpk@isc.org>
Message-ID: <5f70ea80-8b89-e7dd-7960-7a22ff8c8012@isc.org>
Date: Mon, 08 Jul 2019 20:46:42 +0200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.7.2
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <BCD5A218-CF1A-4569-B8A2-7BC8B499CC4B@verisign.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/a_QvT9eOUTffQcP6bn6i7x2NsAA>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] proposal: Covert in-band zone data
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 08 Jul 2019 18:47:13 -0000

W dniu 08.07.2019 o 19:20, Wessels, Duane pisze:>> On Jul 8, 2019, at
9:20 AM, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> wrote:
>>
>>
>> As far as this particular idea goes, I mentioned before what had given me pause: we're talking about taking a protocol where every RRSet in a zone to date has been public and is made available in DNS responses. Any server that doesn't implement this new mechanism would presumably treat the new covert RRTypes as they would any other unknown/opaque type and make the data public.
>>
>> There is hence an operational risk that data will leak (e.g. by configuration changes, software downgrades that are pragmatic necessities, side systems that publish zone data in ways other than the DNS).
>>
>> By keeping data that is already exchanged over a (manual) out-of-band channel separate, and not packaging them up with zone data, the existing segregation of private vs. public is preserved and the task is simply to automate a process that is currently manual.
> 
> I share this concern raised by Joe.  I agree that it can be useful to exchange configuration/provisioning data this way, but leaks seem almost inevitable as proposed.
We tried to include as many safeguards as possible, but I don't think
we'd ever be able to avoid footie-shootie. I'd just add a section in
"Security consideration" with summary of the issues stated above.

> I'll probably regret this, but what about a COVERT class, instead type RR type?But then a) we'll end up with a dual-class zones b) nobody would
implement it, as I don't think anything but BIND supports classes other
than IN (correct me if I'm wrong?)

Witold