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Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers

David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org> Wed, 13 February 2019 16:30 UTC

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From: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>
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Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 08:30:11 -0800
Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
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References: <2019021215560470371417@cnnic.cn> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1902120846480.18026@bofh.nohats.ca> <201902131403257357123@cnnic.cn>
To: zuopeng@cnnic.cn
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers
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On Feb 12, 2019, at 10:03 PM, zuopeng@cnnic.cn wrote:
> that's ture. but in my view, if the trust chain is built, we can ensure a resolver(or a cache) is always talking to a identified server and the channel is always secure, then the content could not be tampered.

Your model of how the DNS actually works is too simplistic.

Regards,
-drc

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