Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...

Christopher Morrow <christopher.morrow@gmail.com> Thu, 27 March 2014 19:26 UTC

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Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 15:26:17 -0400
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From: Christopher Morrow <christopher.morrow@gmail.com>
To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
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Cc: dnsop WG <dnsop@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 2:39 PM, Nicholas Weaver
<nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu> wrote:
>
> On Mar 27, 2014, at 11:18 AM, Christopher Morrow <christopher.morrow@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 10:52 AM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
>>> Yes. If doing it for the DNS root key is too politically challenging, maybe do it for one of the 1024-bit trust anchors in the browser root pile.
>>
>> why would this be politically sensitive?
>
> Because the browsers have already decided killing of 1024b CAs is a good idea, and they could revoke just those CAs once someone breaks a 1024b example, since the browser vendors have good experience in revoking bad CAs already (queue DigiNotar...)
>
>
> In contrast, DNSSEC seems mired in a 1024b swamp at the root, and when you can use an old key (which you can for the root, since you can fake everything up below that dynamically and fake NTP so that your bad key is still kosher), breaking a root key really would be breaking DNSSEC.


that didn't answer the question really? Do you mean: "NTIA/ICANN (pick
your place depending on day and worldview) would be upset that someone
proved there are no pants on the emperor."

I'm not sure that matters though? Just because you did it and
published the result/example doesn't mean that this isn't already
happening all over the net, right? I don't know that there's a reason
to NOT do the experiment and publish, without some impetus, what's
going to drive the change? given other priorities that exist and
already have leadership attention...

Why don't you just go do the experiment nick and let us know how it goes?