Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...

[S Moonesamy <[e-mail]>]

At 15:47 27-03-2014, Joe Abley wrote:
>There was a plan underway to roll the KSK. I was at ICANN briefly 
>when that started (I spoke publicly, albeit briefly about it in the 
>dnsop meeting in Berlin). I'm no longer at ICANN and hence no longer 
>have anything authoritative to say, but it seems plausible that the 
>events leading up to NTIA's announcement the other week caused some 
>delays or rescheduling of the KSK roll project. A KSK roll would be 
>a good opportunity to change the key size.

Yes, assuming that there is a reason for such a change [1].

I could not find any report about the outcome of the Rollover consultation.

Regards,
S. Moonesamy

1. "To date, despite huge efforts, no one has broken a regular 
1024-bit key;  in fact, the best completed attack is estimated to be 
the equivalent of a 700-bit key.  An attacker breaking a 1024-bit 
signing key would need to expend phenomenal amounts of networked 
computing power in a way that would not be detected in order to break 
a single key. Because of this, it is estimated that most zones can 
safely use 1024-bit keys for at least the next ten years."  That was 
the IETF Consensus in 2012.