IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec3-guidance-02.txt

Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net> Wed, 09 February 2022 21:41 UTC

Return-Path: <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2D5043A0D29 for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 9 Feb 2022 13:41:46 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RawD0MaF2fah for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 9 Feb 2022 13:41:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.hardakers.net (mail.hardakers.net [168.150.192.181]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C2E2B3A0D05 for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Wed, 9 Feb 2022 13:41:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost (unknown [10.0.0.3]) by mail.hardakers.net (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4699728B37; Wed, 9 Feb 2022 13:41:41 -0800 (PST)
From: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
To: Vladimír Čunát <vladimir.cunat+ietf@nic.cz>
Cc: dnsop@ietf.org
References: <163777315136.16773.10633006296842101587@ietfa.amsl.com> <4e4527b6-b0b3-33f3-3849-8a593fe29a1d@nic.cz>
Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2022 13:41:41 -0800
In-Reply-To: <4e4527b6-b0b3-33f3-3849-8a593fe29a1d@nic.cz> ("Vladimír Čunát"'s message of "Fri, 26 Nov 2021 12:30:07 +0100")
Message-ID: <ybly22j7m5m.fsf@w7.hardakers.net>
User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/27.2 (gnu/linux)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/eku8Fjxu64f0v-hq2qYxb5SsvJc>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec3-guidance-02.txt
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2022 21:41:46 -0000

Vladimír Čunát <vladimir.cunat+ietf@nic.cz> writes:

>     Note that a validating resolver MUST still validate the signature over the NSEC3 record to ensure
>     the iteration count was not altered since record publication (see {{RFC5155}} section 10.3).
>    
> It might be better to clarify that this "MUST" does not really apply to the SERVFAIL case.  (The text
> around has changed recently.)
> 
> I think this SERVFAIL will generally be best implemented by simply ignoring any NSEC3 above the
> corresponding limit.  Maybe I'd even standardize the case that way, but I don't care really. It's an
> advantage unstated in the draft that this is very easy to do, leaving no room for bugs (e.g.
> unintentional downgrade opportunities).

So I've re-arranged things a bit to hopefully address the flow better.
Let em know if you think further improvements are warranted.
-- 
Wes Hardaker
USC/ISI

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email