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Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Tue, 12 February 2019 22:20 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 14:20:18 -0800
In-Reply-To: <9e56da22-4fb5-1c68-3bfc-85283b0e8480@redbarn.org>
Cc: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
To: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
References: <2019021215560470371417@cnnic.cn> <20190212083908.w5cwgtmypkjwmqnd@nic.fr> <ecfdb33d-7925-f762-6788-68b7a659a3d8@redbarn.org> <43FF2435-37C6-43B0-B97C-59D23AD2A9C2@virtualized.org> <873fe3e1-58e4-38a7-eb11-37509f9b7ff4@redbarn.org> <D01BFEEE-746D-4F30-A3CE-497D4AFA8CC5@fugue.com> <7cdbd8a8-2bf4-992e-3197-ca17e7352a5b@redbarn.org> <725FD25D-FCE9-4740-A001-79369AFDEB78@fugue.com> <d1f66089-1e78-15f6-269c-33ced12c2738@redbarn.org> <3C1FF728-2F31-4884-B7E9-55DF4E15AEB6@fugue.com> <cb9646e3-676d-c24f-240d-e0c8ed159e88@redbarn.org> <4C2F9639-6C22-4FB7-840B-0318B40C2193@fugue.com> <9e56da22-4fb5-1c68-3bfc-85283b0e8480@redbarn.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] extension of DoH to authoritative servers
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On Feb 12, 2019, at 2:18 PM, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> wrote:
> lack of an IETF-approved standard with planned implementation by a half dozen tech giants, means that other malicious traffic will not be able to hide in the crowd, and can be made subject to policy, and complaints.

So you’re saying that DoH traffic that’s not going to well-known IP addresses is easier to detect than DoH traffic going to well-known IP addresses?

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